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To answer policy questions that have intergenerational implications, a computable simulation
model should obey four conditions: it should incorporate long-term demographic developments,
it should include a detailed modelling of the public sector, it should decompose the population
into several generations and it should account for the behaviour of the various economic agents.
This document describes and illustrates a model that meets all these conditions. It is an applied
general equilibrium model that is based on generational accounting principles named GAMMA
(Generational Accounting Model with Maximizing Agents).
Abstract in Dutch
De intergenerationele implicaties van beleid kunnen worden ingeschat met een model dat de
lange-termijnbevolkingsontwikkeling, de bevolkingssamenstelling, de publieke sector en het
gedrag van de economische agenten beschrijft. Dit document bespreekt en illustreert een model
dat deze karakteristieken heeft. Het is een toegepast, algemeen-evenwichtsmodel met
overlappende generaties, waarbij alle tranasacties met de publieke sector en de pensioensector
per generatie worden bepaald (generationele rekeningen). We noemen het GAMMA
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The need to make accurate long-run economic and ﬁscal projections has become increasingly
important in recent years in light of the demographic changes occuring in The Netherlands. The
changing population structure will have profound impacts on the Dutch economy, public
ﬁnances and pension system in the years ahead. To simulate long-run developments and assess
the intergenerational implications of reforms that address the effects of demographic changes,
the CPB uses the computable general equilibrium model GAMMA (Generational Accounting
Model with Maximizing Agents) as an instrument. This document gives an accessible
description of GAMMA. In addtition to a system of generational accounts for the government
sector, the model includes a detailed elaboration of the private pension sector, overlapping
generations of households and sub-models for household and ﬁrm behaviour. Integration of
these sub-models guarantees consistency, accounts for endogenous behavioural reactions after
policy changes and makes an evaluation of the welfare effects of policy measures possible.
Over the past ﬁve years, several people have contributed to the development and application of
GAMMA. Nick Draper was primarily responsible for the model building project. The other
contributors were Alex Armstrong, Jan Bonenkamp, Andre Nibbelink, Harry ter Rele, Richard
Rosenbrand and Ed Westerhout. Gilbert van Hagen and Thijs Knaap were involved in the project
at an earlier stage. This document was edited by Alex Armstrong and Nick Draper; Jan
Bonenkamp, Harry ter Rele and Ed Westerhout also contributed to the text. Both Andre
Nibbelink and Richard Rosenbrand gave technical support.
The project team would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Lans Bovenberg, Rob
Alessi and CPB colleagues Peter Broer, Casper van Ewijk, Peter Kooiman, Ruud de Mooij, Adri




Changes in the demographic structure of The Netherlands will profoundly impact the economy
in the coming decades. Low fertility and increasing life expectancy will combine to produce a
dramatic increase in the elderly dependency ratio. A higher proportion of retirees to workers will
result in increased demands on the public pension and health care systems as well as in a relative
shrinkage in the tax base. The Dutch case is not typical. Many industrialized countries face the
same issues, although they may differ in the timing of the developments and their severity. The
reason is that the demographic developments that underlie population ageing as well as the
ﬁnancing method of social security deviate from each other. A long list of studies now exists that
quantify the long-run development of public ﬁnances in a typical country (Van Ewijk et al.
(2006) for the Netherlands, Guest (2006) for Australia) or several countries (Raffelhueschen
(1999a), European Commission (2006)).
The problems caused by demographic changes can be addressed in a number of ways.
Policies of increased taxation or reduced government expenditure can help to alleviate the
pressure on public ﬁnances. The same holds true for institutional reforms of the pension sector,
the health care sector or the sector that provides long-term care services. Despite the fact that all
these policies contribute to an improved ﬁscal outlook, they differ in a number of aspects. First,
policies that affect the behaviour of households differently may have different macroeconomic
effects. An obvious example is a reform that raises taxes versus a reform that reduces public
expenditure. Second, various policies may have differing effects on different generations of
households, such as a reform that is implemented immediately versus a reform that delays the
adjustment until some later time. Third, policy reforms may be different in their direct ﬁscal
impact. Policies that reduce expenditure on national defense, for example, may have an effect on
the primary surplus that grows in line with GDP. Whereas the effect of policies that reduce health
care consumption may grow in line with the much higher increase of health care consumption.
In order to make long-run ﬁscal projections and answer policy questions that have
intergenerational implications, a computable simulation model should obey four conditions: it
should incorporate long-term demographic developments, it should include a detailed modelling
of the public sector, it should decompose the population into several generations and it should
account for the behaviour of the various economic agents. This document describes and
illustrates a model that meets these conditions. It is an applied general equilibrium model that is
based on generational accounting principles named GAMMA (Generational Accounting Model
with Maximizing Agents). Hence it is a new member of the family of overlapping generation
(OLG) models, which we take to consist of generational accounting (GA) models and applied
general equilibrium (AGE) models that distinguish different generations of households.
Obviously, the GAMMA model is not the ﬁrst in the ﬁeld of models that feature overlapping
generations (OLG) of households. Following Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for the U.S.,
11models have been constructed for individual European countries (Lassila and Valkonen (2001),
Jensen et al. (2002), Lassila (1999)) and for multiple countries (Borsch-Supan et al. (2006) and
INGENUE (2005)). Neither is GAMMA the ﬁrst OLG model for the Netherlands (Broer
(2001)). However, it differs from most other OLG models mainly on three accounts. The ﬁrst is
the inclusion of behaviour of economic agents like households, ﬁrms and pension funds, which
distinguishes GAMMA from the class of generational accounting (GA) models. The second is
the detailed modelling of institutions in the public sector, which distinguishes GAMMA from
many applied general equilibrium (AGE) models. Third, a characteristic of GAMMA is the
speciﬁc version of the life-cycle approach that the model adopts to describe the saving and
labour supply behaviour of households which is, as far as we know, unique in models with
overlapping generations of households.
GA models have been quite successful since their introduction in the early nineties
(Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1991)). As they make so few speciﬁc assumptions, they can be applied
in a variety of circumstances. Indeed, GA models are nowadays applied worldwide by
researchers to assess the sustainability and intergenerational implications of ﬁscal policies in
various countries, two issues that are highly relevant for policy making (Auerbach and Leibfritz
(1999), Raffelhueschen (1999a), Raffelhueschen (1999b)). By their nature, GA models are well
suited for analyzing the implications of long-term trends, such as demographic changes.
However, when it comes to the analysis of policy reforms, GA models are less suitable due to
their neglect of economic behaviour. For instance, they may give false answers to questions
about the incidence of taxation (Haveman (1994), Buiter (1995)).
Due to its inclusion of economic behaviour, GAMMA improves GA models on both
accounts. In particular, accounting for economic behaviour implies that age proﬁles of various
tax items are endogenous. Policy reforms that affect tax bases may change these age proﬁles as
well. Hence, accounting for economic behaviour may also affect the assessment of the ﬁscal
stance. Furthermore, GAMMA improves upon the ﬁrst generation of GA models by accounting
for changes in age proﬁles that result from future trends. As Bovenberg and ter Rele (2000) have
shown, it is particularly relevant to account for likely changes of labour market participation
rates and for the increasing scope (maturing) of pension schemes when making ﬁscal projections.
A ﬁnal point on which the GAMMA model improves on GA models is the scope of
generational accounting. Where GA calculations tend to focus on the transfers to and from the
public sector, our model also accounts for transfers to and from pension funds that provide
supplementary pensions. This is important in cases where policy reforms affect not only net
beneﬁts from the public sector, but also those from the pension sector.
AGE models are constructed precisely for simulating the effects of policy reforms (Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987), Altig et al. (2001), Bovenberg and Knaap (2005)). Models of this type that
focus on ageing populations distinguish between different age cohorts, allowing them to assess
the intergenerational implications of government policies. When it comes to making future
12projections and assessing ﬁscal sustainability, these models are less suitable, however. The
reason is not so much fundamental as practical. AGE models often lack the kind of institutional
details that may be particularly relevant for predicting the future development of the economy.
GAMMA improves on these models due to its detailed description of institutions in the public
and private pension sectors.
This document gives a full description of GAMMA. It describes its component modules
(households, ﬁrms, pension funds, the government), and it explains the calibration procedure and
the solution method. In addition it illustrates the working of the model with four sets of
simulations:
• A projection of the likely development of the Dutch economy under the hypothetical assumption
of unchanged government policies;
• A set of scenarios that describe the effects of alternative demographic developments;
• A set of scenarios that illustrate the effects of tax policy reforms;
• A set of scenarios that illustrate the effects of pension reforms.
That GAMMA can be used both for projections and simulations was illustrated before in two
other publications (Westerhout et al. (2004) and Van Ewijk et al. (2006)). The simulations
presented here show the effects of policy reforms upon the Dutch economy, upon the welfare of
different generations and upon the time path of the government deﬁcit and the government debt.
The structure of the document is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the building blocks of
GAMMA. Chapter 3 discusses the calibration of the model. Chapter 4 presents the baseline
projection. Chapter 5 presents several simulations that illustrate the working of the model:
including both sensitivity scenarios and policy reform scenarios. Five appendices give
information about the bookkeeping system, the derivations of the houshold model, the
derivations of the ﬁrm model, the growth characteristics of the model and the deﬁnitions of the
symbols used in this document.
13142 A dynamic open-economy overlapping generation model
This chapter presents a technical description of the GAMMA model. The model distinguishes
markets for goods, capital, labour and a ‘market’ for income transfers from the government to
households. GAMMA identiﬁes the following agents: households, pension funds, the
government, ﬁrms and the foreign sector. Households are divided up into one hundred age
cohorts. The government and private pension sectors are elaborated in detail, and a
comprehensive set of generational accounts for all current and future generations is given.
GAMMA goes beyond the traditional generational accounting framework by incorporating
the economic behaviour of households, ﬁrms and pension funds. Households decide on labour
supply and private saving, ﬁrms decide on demand for labour and capital, and pension funds
decide on pension contributions and beneﬁt levels. Agents are rational and forward looking, and
optimise in a consistent microeconomic framework. GAMMA thus allows for welfare analysis
of policy reforms. However, since perfect labour and capital markets are assumed, the model is
not equipped to describe short- and medium-term dynamics.
The following features are attached to the Dutch economy. First, the economy is small
relative to the outside world. That is, domestic policies do not affect the interest rate, which is
determined on world capital markets. Second, goods produced at home are perfect substitutes
for those produced abroad: prices are given and terms-of-trade effects are absent. This ﬁts in
with the long-term horizon of the model. Third, the model is deterministic. Lifetime uncertainty
is recognised, but perfect capital markets enable households to insure against longevity risk.
The population model in section 2.1 outlines the development of the demographic
distribution over one hundred age cohorts. Aggregation rules are discussed in section 2.2. The
household, government and pension models make use of the generated population distributions.
The household model (section 2.3) is based on the life-cycle theory for individual behaviour.
Section 2.4 discusses the ﬁrm model and factor demand relations. The government model
(section 2.5) is a generational accounting framework in which expenditures and revenues are
linked to the age of individuals. No economic behaviour is assumed on the part of the
government.
The pension model (section 2.6) does include economic behaviour. Indeed contribution rates
and indexation factors are functions of the coverage ratio of pension funds, i.e. the amount of
ﬁnancial wealth in terms of pension rights. Finally, 2.7 explains the equilibrium conditions and
solution method for GAMMA. Appendix A presents a bird’s-eye view of the interactions
between the various components by summarizing the bookkeeping system as a circular ﬂow of
the macroeconomy.
152.1 Demography
GAMMA does not directly plug in projections of the age structure of the population but derives
them from a demographic model that links the age structure to the development of fertility rates,
mortality rates and rates of immigration and emigration. This is done for two reasons. The ﬁrst
is that the Statistics Netherlands demographic forecast on which the calculations with the
GAMMA model are based run only to 2100, while our calculations need projections over a
longer time horizon.1 The second is that we need a population model in order to be able to
simulate alternative demographic developments. 2
The demographic model of GAMMA splits the population up into one hundred age cohorts j
∈ (0,...,99), each of which is subdivided into men and women. The gender distinction is
appropriate because of the differing mortality probabilities by sex: women live longer than men
on average. The population vector ns
g(t)3 at the end of year t, which gives the distribution over




In this equation T is the time dependent transformation matrix which describes the inﬂuences of
emigration, death and birth and ni is the time dependent immigration vector. The population
vector is 200×1: the ﬁrst hundred elements consist of women aged 1-100 and the last hundred
of men of the same age. The transformation matrix T is large (200×200), but sparse. That is,
most elements are zero.
The relationships for men and women are similar, so here we restrict ourselves to the
description of the female population. Aside from the ﬁrst row (and row hundred and one) all
elements of matrix T, except the elements (j, j−1) are zero. Element (j, j−1) describes the
probability that a woman of cohort j−1 will remain in the country and survive into the next
period. That is, element (j, j−1) is the complement of emigration probability qe and the
probability of death qd (i.e. T(j, j−1) = 1−qe(j)−qd(j)). The ﬁrst row describes the number
of births in a period. The number of births depends on the size of the fertile age cohorts: ages 16
up to 50. So in the ﬁrst row, elements 17 up to 51 consist of the fertility rates multiplied by the
probability that the baby is a girl.
Unlike the demographic model of GAMMA, the economic part of the model does not
distinguish between men and women. Only the age distribution of individuals (men and women
1 The reason for a longer forecast period is a technical one. We need a forecast end year with a steady (growth)
demographic and economic development. Only in a steady-state year we can break off the calculations due to a perfect
foresight assumption in the economic model.
2 In the long run, demographic developments are subject to a high level of uncertainty. The GAMMA model is used to
assess this uncertainty, for instance, in the DEMWEL project (See: Armstrong et al. (2007))
3 A superscript s denotes a stock variable.
16together) plays a role, which is obtained as ns
h(t) = Ens
g(t) with E being the aggregation matrix
(two side-by-side unit matrices). Element j of vector ns
h is the number of individuals of age j.
2.2 Aggregation
In this document we use sufﬁxes as indicators for variables that refer to speciﬁc time periods or
ages. For individual variables we use only the age sufﬁx j, for intergenerational variables we use
both the age sufﬁx j and the time sufﬁx t, for aggregated (macro) variables we use only time
sufﬁx t. At the individual level time and age are related on a one-to-one basis, so using the age
indicator j is sufﬁcient.
GAMMA assumes that all individuals of the same age are equal. Stocks are measured at the
end of the period and are indicated with a superscript s. A stock variable, xs (j,t), related to an
individual of age j multiplied by the population size of the same age ns
h(j,t) results in the cohort
variable ns
h(j,t)xs (j,t). The population size of age j at the end of period t is relevant for the
ﬂows in period t +1. A ﬂow variable, x(j,t), related to an individual of age j multiplied by the
population size of the previous year ns
h(j−1,t −1) results in the cohort variable
ns
h(j−1,t −1)x(j,t). One population unit represents one thousand people. Stocks and ﬂows per
population unit are also measured in thousands. This results in total values per cohort in millions.
Macro variables are obtained by aggregating over the cohorts xs (t) = 10−3åjns
h(j,t)xs (j,t)
and x(t) = 10−3åjns
h(j−1,t −1)x(j,t), so macro values are in billions. In the following
sections we make use of these aggregation rules without presenting them explicitly.
2.3 Households
This section discusses one of the model’s main building blocks, the module concerning the
consumption-saving and labour supply behaviour of households. Like most AGE models,
GAMMA bases consumption-saving and labour supply behaviour on life-cycle theory (e.g.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Altig et al. (2001), Broer (2001), Lassila and Valkonen (2001)
and Bovenberg and Knaap (2005)). Unlike most of these models, our instantaneous utility
speciﬁcation is such that leisure is independent of household wealth. This seems to be in line
with econometric evidence, which suggests small wealth effects on the demand for leisure.4
Moreover, this utility speciﬁcation implies a positive correlation between commodity
consumption and labour supply, which is consistent with excess sensitivity (a positive
correlation between commodity consumption and expected income changes aside from the
inﬂuence of the interest rate) found in the econometric literature (see Flavin (1981)).
4 Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) conclude in their survey article on early retirement that the wealth effect on labour supply
is small relative to the price effect. The estimates in Blundell and Macurdy (1999) also point to small wealth effects on
labour supply.
17The life-cycle model is made data consistent using ‘taste shifters’: age-speciﬁc and time-speciﬁc
parameters in the utility function which account for the effects of age and household situation on
commodity consumption and labour supply. This section derives the indirect utility speciﬁcation
which leads in a natural way to the equivalent variation deﬁnition that we use for welfare
analysis. Lastly, we elaborate on the relationship between different pension systems and
household behaviour in appendix B.4.
Sub-section 2.3.1 presents the assumptions. The implied consumption-saving and labour
supply behaviour is discussed in sub-section 2.3.2. Sub-section 2.3.3 gives an graphical
exposition of the workings of the model. A money measure of utility, which can be used for
welfare analysis, is derived in sub-section 2.3.4. We end with some concluding remarks. The
appendices present the main technicalities.
2.3.1 Assumptions
An individual of age j maximizes his expected remaining lifetime utility U, which depends on
per-period utility u and on the subjective discount factor ds (as opposed to the objective discount
factor which is introduced below). Expectations have to be formed because life expectancy is
uncertain, so it is assumed that individuals weigh their future per-period utility with survival











In this equation je (=99) is the maximum attainable age5, δ the time preference parameter,
which measures the impatience to consume, and ζ(j) the conditional (upon being alive at j−1)
probability of living through the next year. Households derive no utility from leaving bequests.
The subjective discount factor consists of two elements. The ﬁrst element is the already
mentioned survival probability which gives a lower weight to per-period utility in more distant
years. This survival probability equals the accumulated conditional survival rates ζ.6 The second
element of the subjective discount factor gives a lower weight to per-period utility further in the
future due to the impatience of individuals. This impatience element depends on the time
preference parameter δ. Per period utility, u, is a function of the consumption of commodities,
5 The minimum age of independent decision making is 20. Children do not supply labour and their material consumption
is attributed to their parents. This, in part, accounts for the hump-shaped life-cycle consumption proﬁle used for
calibration. See Figure 3.2 in section 3.3.
6 Note, we use as convention Õ
j−1
l=j ζ(l) = 1










αc, αv > 0 , β > 1, γ > 0 and 0 ≤ v ≤ 1.
In this equation 1/γ is the intertemporal substitution elasticity, 1/β is the price elasticity of
leisure demand and αc and αv are positive age and time7 dependent taste shifters which are used
for calibration purposes (see section 3.3). The marginal per-period utility of leisure (uv: the
derivative of u with respect to v) becomes inﬁnite as leisure approaches zero. This guarantees
positive leisure. The restriction that leisure must be equal to or smaller than the maximum
available time (normalized to unity) has to be explicitly enforced. This utility speciﬁcation







Indeed, the marginal utility of the per-period commodity consumption (uc) becomes inﬁnite as
the commodity consumption approaches this minimum level.8 The positive leisure consumption
guarantees positive commodity consumption as long as the price elasticity of leisure demand is
smaller than one (β > 1).
What is the interpretation of this restriction? Deﬁne the right hand side of 2.4 as labour
induced commodity consumption, cl. Labour induced commodity consumption is decreasing in
leisure. Thus it attains its lowest value in case all available time is spent on leisure, i.e. at v = 1.9
So the restriction motivates the positive correlation between commodity consumption and labour
time. In other words, the commodity consumption is large in periods that households supply
more labour. A possible interpretation for the positive correlation between commodity
consumption and labour time may be professional costs. Another interpretation may be shifts
from market goods to home produced goods over the life cycle due to changes in leisure.10
This speciﬁcation has as another characteristic that the per-period marginal rate of
substitution between the commodity consumption and leisure (uc/uv) depends on the latter only:
that is, leisure is determined independently of the intertemporal consumption savings choice. As
a consequence, there is no intertemporal substitution effect of leisure. This speciﬁcation (the
per-period composite good linear in commodity consumption and concave in leisure) was
proposed by Greenwood et al. (1988) and was also used by Heijdra (1998).
7 For convenience we suppress the time indicator.
8 Since households are assumed to be optimizing, it will never be the case that ch = cl. As ch approaches cl, the
household can increase its utility by an inﬁnite magnitude by consuming a marginally higher level of commodities.




1−β ) the restriction
becomes ch(i) > 0 for v = 1.
10 Note, however, that neither professional costs nor home production are modelled in GAMMA.
19Individuals maximize lifetime utility given their budget and leisure constraints using leisure and
commodity consumption as instruments. The budget constraint equates total wealthWs to the













In this equation do is the objective discount factor, pc, pv are the prices for commodity and
leisure consumption11 respectively and rh is the net rate of return on wealth. The objective
discount factor12 consists of two elements. The ﬁrst element makes all future income and
expenditure streams comparable with current ﬁnancial wealth, by discounting it by the
accumulated net rate of return. The second element is the survival probability that also gives a
lower weight to more distant years. This implies that expected income and expenditure streams
are relevant in the budget equation.13
Total wealth is the sum of ﬁnancial wealth Ws
f and human wealth (the discounted value of







Full after-tax non-capital income is deﬁned as the aggregate of net transfer income and labour
income in case all available time is spent working 14. The price of leisure is the marginal reward
of supplying labour, taking into account not just the net wage but also future pension income to
the extent that it can be imputed to current labour (see appendix B.3 for the imputation method
and the inﬂuence of a pension system on the leisure price). This implies that ﬁnancial wealth Ws
f
consists of ﬁnancial wealth actually in the hands of households as well as households’ pension
rights.
The problem of the individual of age j is now to maximize lifetime utility (equation (2.2))
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (2.5) and the restriction v ≤ 1 on leisure. The next
11 Note: the value of consumption in consumer prices is deﬁned as Ch(i) = ch(i)pc(i). The consumption of households
according to the circular ﬂow (see Table A.1) is obtained after aggregation over the age cohorts.
12 Note the difference with the subjective discount factor in utility function (2.2).
13 Expected future income and expenditures are relevant in the budget equation due to a perfect market assumption.
Individuals can diversify their mortality risk on the capital market. More precisely there is a market that transfers the
wealth of the fraction of each cohort that dies in each period to the remaining fraction of that cohort. (This assumption was
introduced by Yaari (1965). Appendix B.1 elaborates).
14 See appendix B.1 for details about the deﬁnition of full income, and appendix B.2 for the different income sources
GAMMA distinguishes. Both appendices also give information on how the individual income sources are related to the
circular ﬂow variables of Table A.1.
20section presents the leisure and commodity consumption relations for his remaining lifetime that
are consistent with utility maximization. Appendix B.4 gives the derivations.
2.3.2 Consumption of commodities and leisure
The assumptions of previous section determine the allocation of total wealth to commodity and
leisure consumption for all periods (s ∈ {j,..., je}) over the remaining life cycle. Optimal
behaviour implies that the per-period marginal rate of substitution between commodity and
leisure consumption (i.e. the per-period utility ratio uc/uv) equals the price ratio (pc/pv) in
every period of the life cycle. The marginal rate of subsitution does not depend on the
commodity consumption by assumption. So we get the leisure demand relation out of this
optimality condition:
v(s) = e v(s) if e v(s) ≤ 1 (2.7)










This relation implies that a commodity price rise makes working less attractive relative to
leisure, while the reverse holds when wages increase. Retirees are always at the corner solution
because for them pv = 0 which implies that v = 1. Note that total expenditure does not appear in
the leisure equation (2.7) and wealth changes do not have effects on leisure and labour supply.15
Another aspect of our version of the life-cycle model is that the wage elasticity of labour supply
is age-dependent. In particular the labour supply elasticity in time s equals v(s)/(1−v(s))/β.
This speciﬁcation implies that the labour supply elasticity of older people (who supply relatively
little labour) is large. The reason is that we take the price elasticity of leisure constant: that is,
independent of age.



















, s ∈ {j,..., je}
15 Note: the price of leisure increases in the long-run in proportion with the general price level and labour productivity.
This implies that the price of leisure relative to the consumption price increases with productivity leading to a continuous
decline in leisure, which is not consistent with empirical evidence. A CES instanteneous utility function should more than
counteract this effect, because leisure becomes linear homogeneous in total wealth, unless the intratemporal substitution
elasticity equals one (Cobb-Douglas utility). This would imply a continuous increase of leisure which seems more
consistent with data, but excludes long-run equilibrium growth. Introduction of a "keeping up with the Jones" effect (see for
instance Gelauff and Graaﬂand (1994)) meets this problem but has as a drawback that welfare analyses become path
dependent. The utility function used by King et al. (1988a) (see also: King et al. (1988b)) makes leisure dependent on the
price of leisure relative to the value of consumption but makes the consumption equation cumbersome. Taking this into
























In equation (2.9) pW is the price index of total wealth, i.e. the composite price of future
consumption,Ws total wealth and cl the labour induced commodity consumption.16 After
subtraction of the discounted value of the labour induced commodity consumption and the
leisure consumption17 a free disposable level of total wealth results (the ﬁrst term between
brackets in equation (2.8)), which is allocated between the different periods dependent on
relative prices (the second and third term between brackets in equation (2.8)).
The interpretation of the commodity consumption equation (2.8) is easiest in the simpliﬁed
case that the taste shifters αc, the intertemporal substitution elasticity (1/γ) and the subjective
and objective discount factors are all equal to one (i.e. a zero time preference parameter, rate of
return and death rates). In this case the relative price term (second and third term between
brackets on the right hand side of equation 2.8) becomes equal to the inverse of the potential
number of remaining periods in the household’s lifetime (je −s).18 The free disposable level of
total wealth is then divided equally over the rest of the life cycle, i.e. commodity consumption
minus the labour induced commodity consumption is completely smoothed over the life cycle.
How does the allocation of total consumption over the life-cycle respond to the values in the
parameters of equation (2.8)?
• All things equal except for a positive value of the time preference parameter δ means that the
subjective discount factor ds becomes smaller for more distant years. In particular a positive
time preference parameter leads to front loading of commodity consumption, i.e. individuals
become more impatient (the second term between brackets decreases over time).
• All things equal except for a higher net rate of return rh leads to a smaller objective discount
factor do for more distant years. This change has two different effects. First, the free disposable
level of total wealth increases because future labour induced commodity consumption is
discounted by a larger discount rate. Second, saving becomes more attractive due to the larger
return on ﬁnancial wealth (the second term between brackets increases over time).
• All things equal except for a price change in one period changes the value of the labour induced
commodity consumption in that period but not the division over time of the free disposable level
of the total wealth. However this result does not hold if the intertemporal substitution elasticity
deviates from one. The last term between brackets in equation (2.8) then induces price effects
16 Note, the expression for the labour induced commodity consumption includes an additional term if the leisure restriction
holds, i.e. if v = 1. Appendix B.4 elaborates.
17 The leisure consumption explains the coefﬁcient β in the ﬁrst term between brackets.
18 Subtitute the expression (2.9) for pW into pW(s)
1
γ −1 and set the intertemporal substitution elasticity at one afterwards.
22over time.19
The following section gives a further interpretation of these results and some graphical
illustrations. These graphs help to give a better insight into the income and substitution effects of
various parametric changes.
2.3.3 Interpretation
To demonstrate some of the intuition behind the model, here we present graphs in which the
life-cycle of individuals is split up into two periods (i.e. je = 2 in the set of equations presented
in last section). For convenience we abstract from the probability of dying after the ﬁrst period
(ζ(1) = 1). We start with a graphical description of the basic decision problem. Then we
graphically analyse behavioural reactions due to changes in the consumption price, the leisure
price and the interest rate respectively.
The left side of Figure 2.1 presents the basic decision problem. Real total consumption
(xh = Xh/pc, i.e. total consumption divided by the consumption price ) in periods 1 and 2 is
depicted on the horizontal and vertical axes respectively. Individuals face a budget constraint,
which is determined by their total wealth Ws. The budget constraint crosses the horizontal axis
at point A(1). At that point the individual consumes his total wealth completely in the ﬁrst
period (xh(2) = 0 and xh(1) =Ws/pc(1)). The budget constraint crosses the vertical axis at
point A(2). At that point the individual consumes his total wealth (which grows at the rate of
return, rh) completely in the second period (xh(1) = 0 and xh(2) = (1+r(2))Ws/pc(2)). The




























left side of Figure 2.1 presents one indifference curve I of the utility functionU, connecting
points with the same utility level. The indifference curves do not have the horizontal and vertical
19 This utility speciﬁcation can be considered to be an extended Stone-Geary utility function (See: Stone (1954) and
Geary (1950)). The extensions involve a CES instead of a Cobb-Douglas form and the endogeneity of the minimum value
of total consumption.
23axes as lower bounds but parallel lines that go through point P on each axis. Indeed, only
commodity consumption above labour induced consumption (deﬁned in 2.4) provides utility.
The same holds for total consumption: only total consumption above labour induced total
consumption gives utility, i.e. xh−xl = ch−cl gives positive utility, with xl the labour induced
total consumption. The maximum is obviously reached at point S because points to the left of
the indifference curve I have lower utility. The optimum is projected onto the axis as x∗
h.
Households allocate their total consumption to leisure and commodity consumption. For each
period the real value of leisure (vpv/pc) is indicated as point B, while the real value of
commodity consumption (ch) is measured by the difference between the point x∗
h and the point
B. Labour induced commodity consumption (cl) is the difference between the projections of
point P and point B on the axes. Leisure v and the labour induced commodity consumption cl
determine the labour induced total consumption level xl above which total consumption xh
generates utility, i.e. the labour induced total consumption level xl determines point P, the
intersection of the asymptotes of the indifference curve.
The left hand side of Figure 2.1 is constructed for the case that the rate of return equals the
subjective discount factor. In that case total consumption will be the same in both periods in
spite of the larger consumption possibilities in period 2.
The right hand side of Figure 2.1 presents the effects of a consumption price rise in the ﬁrst
period only. The equilibrium changes from S to S0. The initial and new situation are indicated
without and with a prime respectively. The budget constraint turns around point A(2), because
the total consumption possibilities in the second period remain the same while the possibilities in
the ﬁrst period decline. It becomes attractive to increase leisure in the ﬁrst period20. As a result,
the labour induced total consumption level declines, leading to a shift to the left of point P. The
consumption of commodities will decline, mainly in the ﬁrst period. Note that leisure does not
change in the second period (P and P0 have the same value on the y axes) and also that there is a
positive correlation between commodity consumption and labour supply.
The left hand side of Figure 2.2 gives the effects of a decrease in the net rate of return.
Saving becomes less attractive so total consumption increases in the ﬁrst period, while it
declines in the second period (the optimum shifts from S to S0). Labour supply does not change
because the price of leisure and commodities remain the same (Point P and B are ﬁxed).
The right hand side of Figure 2.2 gives the effects of a leisure price increase in the ﬁrst
period. Labour supply will increase in the ﬁrst period. Leisure decreases in the ﬁrst period.
However, due to a subsitution effect smaller than one B(1) shifts to the right. Labour induced
commodity consumption increases, too, leading to a shift to the right of point P. The budget line
shifts parallel to the right because it is determined by lifetime total income, so total consumption
20 Note, leisure v increases due to the consumption price rise, but point B(1) = vpv/pc shifts to the right because of a
substitution effect smaller than one






































increases in both periods. However, the increase in the ﬁrst period is larger than in the second
period due to the shift of point P, the labour induced total consumption. This leads to a larger
consumption of commodities in the ﬁrst period than in the second period. This illustrates the
positive correlation between commodity consumption and labour supply.
2.3.4 A money measure of utility
Equivalent variations are used to evaluate government policies with respect to their effects on
efﬁciency and equity. An equivalent variation for a household is deﬁned as the money amount
that gives that household the same utility change as some policy measure. The advantage of
using this measure rather than simply calculating the utility changes lies in the obvious way that
equivalent variations can be aggregated across generations that live in different periods of time.
At any point in time the equivalent variations of different individuals can be aggregated, while
equivalent variations of individuals (or, if aggregated, cohorts) that live in different periods are
comparable after discounting with the market rate of return. The total sum of the discounted
aggregated equivalent variations over individuals and cohorts can be used as an efﬁciency
measure, while a comparison between the individual or cohort aggregated equivalent variations
can be used as an equity measure. On the other hand, aggregation of individual utility changes is
not possible, because utility is not comparable between individuals due to its ordinal character.
The indirect utility function can be used to implement equivalent variations. The indirect
utility function is obtained after substitution of the solution for leisure and commodity




















Indirect utility is a function of real total wealth diminished by the discounted value of the labour
























In this function the subscript 1 denotes the situation after a policy change and subscript 0 the
situation before the policy change, U0 is a monotone transformation of U and represents thus the
same utility ordering. Utility function U0 has as an advantage its linearity in wealth. The term
within brackets is total wealth, net of labour induced commodity consumption. This wealth
measure multiplied by the percentage change of utility, presents us with the equivalent variation.
This formula is intuitively clear because it corresponds to the equivalent variation deﬁnition: the
money amount that gives the same utility change as the considered policy measure.
This theoretically derived welfare measure is not used in Van Ewijk et al. (2006). In that
study, welfare was measured as the sum of lifetime income, the net beneﬁts from the government
and the net beneﬁts from pension funds. The indicator discussed here is roughly the same as that
used in Fehr and Kotlikoff (1997).
The equivalent variations of future cohorts can be made comparable with current cohorts by
discounting with the gross rate of return. After which aggregation over all current and future
cohorts can occur. A positive aggregated equivalent variation indicates that a Pareto
improvement is possible.
2.4 Firms
Private sector production in GAMMA is characterized by a simple neo-classical model for a
representative ﬁrm.21 The model’s perspective is long-run and so it is reasonable to assume
perfect competition in the goods, labour and capital markets. Hence there is one price p for
goods, which is established on the world market. Perfect competition on the labour market gives
the wage rate of an efﬁciency unit of labour22 ple which is determined by the ability of the ﬁrm
to pay, which is determined in turn by the production price, the user cost of capital pk and the
technology of the ﬁrm. Perfect competition on the capital market suggests that the rate of return
is also determined on the world market: that is, the bond rate rb and the rate of return on equity
rs are given. The model abstracts from adjustment costs, an assumption that also seems
reasonable in a long-run context.23
21 The model follows in broad lines Draper and Huizinga (2001).
22 Individual productivity (labour efﬁciency) changes over the life cycle and the productivity at the aggregated level
changes over time. For these reasons we measure labour in standard efﬁciency units.
23 The model does not take into account the disutility of risk. So the model can not explain the risk premium which is a
compensation for the disutility of risk. To prevent erroneous interpretations, the model uses one uniform market rate of
return. This market rate of return is also used as discount rate.
26GAMMA assumes that the ﬁrm maximizes its value given a budget restriction, technology
constraints and the capital accumulation equation. We will now present the details of this budget
restriction, the determinants of ﬁrm’s value and its production technology. Subsequently the
implied capital demand and wage equations will be presented. The derivations are relegated to
appendix C.
2.4.1 The budget, value and technology of the ﬁrm
The value of the representative ﬁrm is determined by a budget restriction indicating how much it
can pay out in dividends each year and an arbitrage equation which values this stream of
dividends on the capital market. The budget restriction of the ﬁrm can be written as:




Dividend payments Div and investment pie can be ﬁnanced out of proﬁts (the term between
brackets) net of taxes Tp, net of central bank proﬁts payed to the government Gcb and net of
government income through leasing of land Gpg, or ﬁnanced out of an increase of debt DWs
be.
Proﬁts equal revenue pyge minus the wage bill plele and interest payments on debt rbWs
be(t −1).
Employment le is measured in efﬁciency units as is the wage rate ple. Taxes consist of the







with Af the ﬁscal depreciation allowance. Fiscal depreciation is based on the historical cost price
of investment and is geometric with a ﬁscal depreciation rate v.24 In period t the ﬁrm is allowed
to deduct v(1−v)i−1p(t −i)ie(t −i) for the investment purchased in period t −i, for all τi≥ 1
according to this depreciation rule. Assume a fraction ρ0 of the principal of the debt is repaid in
each period and a fraction ρ1 of new investment is ﬁnanced with new debt. The ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
decision is not modelled, that is, the debt to equity ratio is exogenous. Debt payment, therefore,
equals (rb+ρ0)Ws




Equations (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14) determine the ﬁrm’s budget.
The value of the ﬁrm is determined by this budget equation and an arbitrage equation that
indicates how this dividend stream is valued on the capital market. The ﬁrm is valued such that
the return rsWs
se(t −1) from having investedWs
se(t −1) in alternative assets equals the return on
24 Fiscal depreciation may be linear or degressive. Fiscal depreciation equal to a ﬁxed percentage of the book value is
allowed if the original investment becomes less productive with age. Since we assume that physical depreciation is
exponential, a degressive ﬁscal depreciation scheme indeed seems most appropriate.
27owning the ﬁrm which consists of a capital gain of DWs
se and a dividend Div:
rsWs
se(t −1) = DWs
se(t)+Div(t). (2.15)
In this equation rs is the nominal return on shares and Ws
se(t)is the value of the ﬁrm at the end of
period t. Forward solution of this equation, assuming that the transversality condition
(limi→¥(1+rs)−iWs
se(t +i) = 0) holds, results in an explicit expression for the value of the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrm produces with capital and labour. Output is produced according to a CES













e(t −1) the relevant capital stock and σ the absolute value of the substitution elasticity





with φ the technical rate of deterioration. Note that technical depreciation and ﬁscal depreciation
do not necessarily coincide. This completes the description of the assumptions.
2.4.2 Factor demand and factor prices
The ﬁrm maximizes its value Ws
se, subject to the budget constraints and its available technology.
Its instruments are investment and employment.
The value of the ﬁrm reaches its maximum in case all available labour supply is employed.
Given this labour supply, the necessary capital stock to produce optimally:
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depends on the user cost of capital relative to the wage rate.




















The ﬁrst term before the brackets, the inverse of the complement of the proﬁt tax, makes capital
costs comparable to wage costs. It deﬁnes the user cost of capital as a before-tax variable. The
ﬁrst term between brackets is the user cost of capital as a percentage of the effective investment
price in case the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by shares only. Let us illustrate this argument. Assume a ﬁrm
starts its business for one year at time t −1 with one unit of capital. This capital unit was
purchased at the price p(t −1). After one year the business can sell the remaining capital, i.e.
1−φ at the larger price p(t). The shareholders will ﬁnance this whole business in case they
28obtain a rate of return rs. On balance the total capital costs equal (after linearizing) the rate of
return on shares plus the rate of deterioration minus the inﬂation rate if all investments are
ﬁnanced with share issues. The second term between brackets consists of two correction factors
which lead to a deviation of the effective investment price from the general price of goods. The
ﬁrst factor is a correction for the ﬁscal depreciation allowance. Indeed, the total discounted value
of the geometric depreciation allowance is ν(ν +rs)
−1. The effective price of the investment
goods diminishes through this ﬁscal facility. The second factor of the second term between
brackets is also a ﬁscal facility which concerns the deductibility of the debt services of the ﬁrm.
A fraction ρ1 of the new investments can be invested with debt. The discounted value of the net
interest costs are then ρ1(rs +ρ0)−1(1−τp)rb. Without debt ﬁnancing the discounted value of
the ﬁnancing costs (with share issues) becomes ρ1(rs +ρ0)−1rs. The difference between those
two ﬁnance forms determine the second correction factor.25
The proﬁt tax rate enters the user cost of capital in three different ways. The net effect of








The tax system encourages investments if the right hand side is larger than the left hand side.














This relation gives the maximum wage the ﬁrm can pay, given the world market price of goods,
the user costs of capital and the available technology.
Different age cohorts j have different productivity levels, which can be represented by their
productivity proﬁle ef(j,t). More precisely, we assume that productivity increases over the life
cycle. This assumption links age j’s wages pl(t) to the macro wage in efﬁciency units ple
pl(j,t) = ple(t)ef(t)ef(j,t) (2.22)







with ld(j,t) employment of age j in period t.
25 Note, the user costs of capital are not inﬂation neutral. An inﬂation increase given constant real rates of return
inﬂuences the user costs of capital due to historical cost price depreciation allowances and due to the speciﬁc ﬁnance
structure.
26 This restriction follows by writing the second term between brackets of the user costs of capital as a−bτp, and setting
a = b.
292.5 The government
This section, which draws heavily upon Ter Rele (1998), discusses how the government sector is
modelled in GAMMA. Using generational accounts both the future budget of the government as
well as the inﬂuence of the government on individual welfare can be determined. This section
discusses ﬁrst how government expenditures and revenues are projected into the future in order
to construct future government budgets. Next the net beneﬁts calculation for separate cohorts is
discussed.
2.5.1 Projecting public ﬁnances into the future
Primary expenditure
We distinguish between two types of primary government expenditures. The ﬁrst consists of the
expenditures of which the beneﬁts can be attributed to beneﬁciaries, i.e. age-related
expenditures. This category consists of expenditures on social security (public pensions Bgp,
disability beneﬁts Bda, unemployment beneﬁts Bun, social assistance Bsa and other expenditure
on social security Bot), health care Bh and education Be, and totals about 26% of GDP. The
second type of primary expenditure consists of the expenditures which can not be attributed to
beneﬁciaries; they are non-age-related. This category consists of expenditure on defense Xd,
general government Xa, transfers abroad Xfo and subsidies Xsu and amounts to around 19% of
GDP.
Age-related expenditure
For most expenditure items in this category, future expenditure levels are constructed by using
the assumption common in GA analysis that, apart from indexation to the wage rate (wage in
efﬁciency units ple multiplied by the productivity level ef) in the private sector, age-speciﬁc
beneﬁts per person from these expenditures remain unchanged. Average public expenditures
related to a person of a certain age, e.g. a 30- or 70-year old, will thus increase each year at a
rate that corresponds to the increase of wages in the private sector. This form of extrapolation,
which is considered to be a reasonable approximation of present public arrangements, leads to
the following projection of the average expenditure on (age related) budget item i for a person of
age j in period t:






The variable Bi(j,t0) represents the average expenditure on item i per person of age j, or the age
proﬁle, in the base year t0. This is generally the last year for which a short term forecast is
available. The aggregate expenditure in period t on age related expenditure item i can be
calculated using the aggregation rules as explained in section 2.2.
There are three exceptions to this method of extrapolation. The ﬁrst concerns disability
30beneﬁts. To derive the future numbers of beneﬁciaries, we include the effects of a number of
recent reforms that aim to curb the inﬂow into these schemes. These reforms are discussed in
Van Ewijk et al. (2006). The second exception relates to unemployment beneﬁts. In this case we
take into account the effect of the business cycle (see below). In these two cases we add an
additional factor to equation (2.24) that accounts for the impact of these factors and affects all
age groups equally in relative terms.
The third exception concerns health care expenditure. In this case we also follow an extended
procedure. In order to account for death-related costs, we decompose the population into
survivors and decedents, deﬁned as persons who will die within one year. The age proﬁle of per
capita health care expenditure is also decomposed into two other age proﬁles: one for per capita
health care expenditures of survivors and another for per capita health care expenditures of
decedents (Van Ewijk et al. (2006) page 69 provide details on this decomposed age proﬁle).
Combining demographic projections with these two age proﬁles yields projections for the
development of health expenditure of survivors and that of decedents through time. Upon
aggregation, we then have the development of health expenditure through time. Note that this is
quite similar to the standard approach. It just decomposes an age proﬁle into two other age
proﬁles and assumes that the latter is constant rather than the former.
Non-age-related expenditure
The second type of expenditure comprises the expenditure items that cannot be attributed to
beneﬁciaries. This category consists of expenditure on defence, general government, transfers
abroad and subsidies. For these expenditure items we assume a ‘ﬂat’ age proﬁle, entailing an
equal beneﬁt for each individual. The aggregate growth rate of these items are assumed to
correspond to that of GDP (deﬁned as the sum of production by the private and public sectors:
Yg =Ygg+Yge). The rationale for this is that expenditure on these items is closely linked to the
size of production in the economy, and GDP may be considered to be the best measure for this
concept.27 This leads to the following equation for projecting the aggregates for these items:




The beneﬁts from these expenditure items are assumed to be distributed equally over all age
groups. This means that the attribution to individuals of age j in year t is arrived at by simply






Interest payments are calculated by multiplying government debt in the previous year by the
interest rate. Government debt increases each year by the sum of the EMU-deﬁcit and the
27 We use GDP at base prices rather than GDP at market prices. The reason is that the latter includes the revenues from
indirect taxation, which cannot be considered as output.
31purchases of ﬁnancial assets (see hereafter).28
Revenues
Government revenues consist of direct taxes on households (including social security
premiums), indirect and other taxes, corporate taxes and revenues from government assets
(including natural gas). GAMMA distinguishes ﬁve sources, or tax bases, from which direct
taxes on households are levied. These tax bases are: labour income exlusive of private pension
and early retirement scheme (VUT) premiums (Ywh(j)−Pp(j)−Per(j)), pension income (public
plus occupational Bgp(j)+Bp(j)), social security other than public pensions
(Bsa(j)+Bda(j)+Bun(j)), third pillar pensions plus early retirement beneﬁts and imputed
income from private assets. The tax bases, which are treated in their respective sections of this
paper, distinguish between age groups. This leads to the following equation for projecting direct
taxes on households from source i for the different cohorts
Ti
y(j,t) = τ i(t)Hi
t(j,t), (2.27)
where Ti
y is the volume of tax revenue, τ i is the tax rate and Hi
t is the tax base. Aggregate tax
receipts can be calculated using the aggregation rules explained in section 2.2.
The projection of indirect and other taxes29 is split up into the part that stems from consumer
spending and the part that is levied on investments. For the part that is based on consumption the
projection into the future follows the projection for private consumption (see the section on
households). The distribution of its burden across age groups simply follows the pattern of
consumption. Indirect taxes on investment are derived by simply linking them to the growth of
aggregate investments (see section 2.4).30
The growth rate of corporate tax revenues is assumed to be equal to that of corporate proﬁts.
In turn, corporate proﬁts are modelled as the balance of private sector production and the sum of
wages, depreciation and the cost of interest on corporate debt. The burden of this tax is
distributed across age groups in line with asset holdings.
We assume that the value of government holdings of ﬁnancial assets remains constant in real
terms. This entails that their share in GDP will fall though time. For the part of government
assets that yields a nominal return, such as bank deposits and bonds, this implies a need for the
purchase of these assets because their real value would otherwise decline. As the EMU
deﬁnition of the budget balance does not include expenditure on ﬁnancial asset purchases, this
implies that the growth of government debt in nominal terms is slightly larger than is indicated
28 The latter is necessary because the costs of acquiring ﬁnancial assets is not included in the concept of the EMU-deﬁcit.
29 This category consists of the value added tax, excises, environmental levies, taxes on the purchase and on the
ownership of cars, taxes on the transfer of the ownership of a house, taxes on the ownership and occupation of a house,
inheritance taxes and a number of taxes yielding small revenues.
30 The ratio of these taxes to consumption and that of these taxes to investments are based on micro-data.
32by the deﬁcit according to the EMU deﬁnition, or that debt redemption by government is smaller
than the surplus.
2.5.2 Sustainability and the sustainability gap
Government policies are unsustainable if, eventually, they lead to exploding budget deﬁcits and
debt levels. A sustainable policy is characterised by deﬁcit and debt levels that are constant
relative to GDP in the long run when all relevant economic ratios, and most speciﬁcally the old
age dependency ratio, have reached a steady state value. By using this as a criterion, policies can
be tested on the property of sustainability.
The sustainability gap is calculated as follows. If the government does not buy shares or
bonds its debt changes with the EMU deﬁcit. The EMU deﬁcit can be split up into debt services







with g the growth rate of GDP, rg the interest rate, qs
dg the debt to GDP ratio, qdg the primary
deﬁcit to GDP ratio. The debt-to-GDP ratio will in general explode in case of a bond rate larger
than the growth rate. The debt to GDP ratio will stabilize in the long run if a sufﬁciently large
adjustment in primary expenditure is made. We deﬁne the sustainability gap, qs, as that change
in the ratio of primary expenditure relative to GDP that is permanent and taken immediately and
that stabilizes the debt to GDP ratio. For government ﬁnances to be sustainable, the discounted
value of the debt to GDP ratio becomes zero (because rg > g). Foreward solution of equation
(2.28) after subtraction of the sustainability gap from the primary deﬁcit, making use of its per














The sustainability gap is thus equal to the initial debt plus the discounted value of future primary
shortages, expressed as an annuity.
2.5.3 Modelling how separate cohorts beneﬁt from the government
The GAMMA model also translates the expenditure and revenue items of the government budget
into the beneﬁts and burdens they bring to individuals over their lifetimes. This takes three steps.
First step
Revenue and expenditure items must be distinguished between those that involve a beneﬁt or
burden to the private sector and those that do not. It is also necessary to include a number of
items in the beneﬁt and burden concept which do not form part of the government budget. Table
31 The EMU deﬁcit svg and the debt services are presented in the circular ﬂow table A.1.
332.1 illustrates these adjustments for 2006. It shows how the composition of beneﬁts differs from
that of public expenditure, and how the composition of the burdens differs from that of public
revenue. A signiﬁcant difference is that ﬂows between the government and the private sector can
be counted as beneﬁts and burdens only if there is no exchange in return. If there is an exchange
in return, it is considered a ‘normal’ economic transaction and the ﬂow can consequently not be
classiﬁed as a beneﬁt or burden. The fact that the public sector is the counterpart of the
transaction is irrelevant. This issue is particularly important with regard to ﬂows resulting from
public assets and liabilities. Interest payments, for example, are not counted as a beneﬁt since
they are a return on an investment. Accordingly, revenues from ﬁnancial assets and natural
resources are not included. The same holds for the proﬁt remitted by the central bank. However,
although these expenditure and revenue items do not themselves constitute a beneﬁt or burden,
they do have an indirect effect by reducing, or respectively increasing, the budgetary room for
other items that do involve a beneﬁt or burden.
Table 2.1 Conversion of expenditure and revenues into beneﬁts and burdens
Expenditure Adjustment Beneﬁts
(%GDP)
Defence 1.3 0.0 1.3
General government 9.5 0.4 9.9
Infrastructure 1.5 0.7 2.2
Education 5.4 0.1 5.5
Subsidies 2.0 0.0 2 .0
Health 8.8 0.0 8.8
Social Security 12.0 0.0 12.0
Transfers abroad 2.2 0.0 2.2
Interest payments 2.5 − 2.5 0.0
Total 45.2 − 1.3 43.9
Revenues Adjustment Burden
Taxes on households 21.8 0.0 21.8
Corporate taxes 2.6 0.0 2.6
Other taxes 14.9 0.0 14.9
Revenues from assets, incl. natural resources 2.8 − 2.8 0.0
Seigniorage 0.0 0.2 0.2
Other revenues 4.1 0.0 4.1
Total 46.2 − 2.6 43.6
EMU-deﬁcit Adjustment Net beneﬁt
Balance − 1.0 1.3 0.3
Another difference between the two classiﬁcations is that we do not include gross investments in
the beneﬁt concept. Nor do we include funds borrowed to ﬁnance the budget deﬁcit as a burden.
34These items have future effects on net beneﬁts. However, the beneﬁt concept does include
beneﬁts from the stock of public assets. These have to be estimated since there is no observable
ﬂow.
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A ﬁnal difference is seigniorage. This is the cost to the private sector of holding notes and coins.
This cost in a way counterbalances the remittance of the central bank’s proﬁt. The central bank
earns its proﬁt on assets (mainly on foreign exchange) that were deposited by the private sector
to obtain money balances. Since interest is not earned on notes and coins, this exchange involves
a loss of interest to the private sector, and thus forms a burden.
The conversion has a sizable effect of 1.3 procent of GDP. Whereas the EMU deﬁcit equals
−1.0% of GDP, aggregate net beneﬁts from the government amount to 0.3% of GDP.
Second step
The second step assigns the beneﬁts and burdens to individuals of each cohort. Figure 2.3
reveals the distribution of beneﬁts across individuals (the age proﬁle) in 2006 over the full range
of age groups. The total beneﬁt corresponds to the sum of the age proﬁles of age related and
non-age related expenditure items (see equations (2.24) and (2.26)). Figure 2.3 shows that
beneﬁts generally rise with age. The two main components of this rise are social security and
health care. Beneﬁts from social security rise with age mainly due to public pensions (AOW),
which are paid only to citizens over the age of 65, and disability beneﬁts, which increase with
age for those younger than 65 years. Health care costs rise with age because of growing costs of
illness and of provisions for the elderly. Other beneﬁts include those on education, among
35others. These are not shown separately.










for p age-related beneﬁt categories and q non-age-related beneﬁt categories.
The age proﬁles of the burden from taxation also vary with age (see Figure 2.4). Until the
age of about 50, labour incomes (and hence tax revenues from these incomes) rise with age.
Beyond the age of 50, tax payments fall, due to the gradually decreasing labour force
participation. The declining labour incomes are not fully offset by various forms of pension
incomes, which are subject to income tax. Accordingly, income taxes fall with age.
The total burden for an average individual of age j in a given year can be expressed as:
Ttb(j) = Ty(j)+Tin(j)+Tp(j)+Ts(j) (2.31)
In this equation Ty, Tin, Tp and Ts represent aggregate direct income taxes on households,
aggregate indirect and other taxes, corporate taxes and seigniorage respectively.
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The average net beneﬁt for individuals of age j in year t (Bn) can be calculated by:
Bn(j) = B(j)−Ttb(j) (2.32)
The age proﬁle of net beneﬁts from the public sector is shown as Figure 3.3 in section 3.5.
36Third step
The third step calculates the lifetime net beneﬁts for average individuals of separate cohorts over
their remaining lifetimes. Therefore, it uses the data on individual net beneﬁts as presented in the








In this equation Bn represents the net beneﬁts and dn(i) is the same as the objective discount
factor as deﬁned in equation 2.5 except that the discount rate on government debt rg is used
instead of the household discount rate rh. The net lifetime beneﬁt of future generations can be
made comparable with current generations by discounting.32
2.6 Pension funds
The pension model discussed in this section describes the second pillar, the pillar consisting of
supplementary pension arrangements. The pension model of GAMMA contains both a deﬁned
beneﬁt (DB) and a deﬁned contribution (DC) scheme. The default pension scheme is an average
wage DB scheme which is described below in the main text. However, the opportunity exists to
run the model with a ﬁnal wage DB scheme or with a DC scheme. Descriptions of the last two
pension schemes are presented in appendix (D). The rest of this section is organised as follows.
We start with an overview of the main assumptions used in the pension block of the GAMMA
model. Then we turn to the description of the pension model itself.
2.6.1 Overview
Modelling the second pillar of the Dutch pension system requires, ﬁrst of all, a clear
understanding of the key characteristics of this pillar. Therefore we start with a brief overview of
the most important aspects of the second pillar:
• By law, second-pillar pensions must be fully funded. This means that during the working period
assets are set aside. This stock of accumulated assets forms the basis of future pension beneﬁts.
• In the second pillar the EET regime applies. According to this tax regime pension contributions
and investment returns are tax exempt while pension beneﬁts are taxed.
• A pension fund is obliged to charge a uniform contribution rate (‘doorsneepremie’). There is no
premium differentiation because of age, sex or income. At the same time, every year a
participant builds up the same percentage of her wage income as future pension beneﬁts. The
combination of a uniform premium rate and a time invariant accrual rate leads to
32 In (Van Ewijk et al. (2006)) the total productivity growth factor was used as the discount factor.
37intergenerational redistribution effects.
• The pensionable age is 65.
2.6.2 An average wage deﬁned beneﬁt system
We start the description of the pension fund with the contribution base. All households receive a
public pension (AOW) beneﬁt Bgp starting from the age of 65. Pensions in the second pillar are
supplementary to the AOW beneﬁt. This implies that households need not build up future
pension beneﬁts over their entire gross income. Instead, a franchise is deducted to correct for the
AOW beneﬁt. The contribution base of an individual of age j then equals the gross wage (plg)
minus a franchise (fp) if she works full time and participates fully in the pension system. We
take account of the fact that many individuals work part-time and consequently, do not build up a
full-time pension beneﬁt, by correcting the full-time contribution base by the amount of leisure
(v) consumed. We denote by ε the fraction of workers with a supplementary pension





(1−v(j))ε(j), j ∈ jw,..., jr (2.34)
In the DB scheme the pension beneﬁt is guaranteed while the contribution rate is uncertain. The
pension beneﬁt is linked to gross labour income. As the name itself already reveals, in an
average wage scheme the level of pension beneﬁts depends on the average wage earned over the
working life. Every year an individual builds up a ﬁxed percentage (aa
p) of his contribution base
as (future) pension beneﬁt, beginning from the ﬁrst working year (jw) until the year of retirement
(jr). After retirement the pension accrual only grows with the amount of indexation until the age










pHp(j) if j ∈ {jw,..., jr −1}
Wa
ph(j−1)ψ(j) if j ∈ {jr,..., je}
(2.35)
with ψ the indexation parameter. So the pension rights Wa
ph(j) gives the expected discounted
value of the pension beneﬁt at the retirement age accumulated up until year j. In the model any
combination of wage indexation and inﬂation indexation is possible.
Pension funds must fund the expected value of the guaranteed pension liabilities. The
expected nominal pension liabilities (Zs














38In this equation dp is the relevant objective discount factor for nominal pension liabilities and rb
the bond rate. The objective discount factor again consists of two elements. The ﬁrst element
makes all future expenditure streams comparable, by discounting them with the bond rate. The
second element is the survival probability that also gives a lower weight to more distant years.
This second element implies that expected nominal liabilities are calculated. Note that future
price or wage indexation of the pension beneﬁts are not included in the expected nominal
liabilities.
The pension fund invests both in stocks and in bonds. In the model it is assumed that the
portfolio choice is exogenous. As a consequence, the portfolio rate of return (rp) is simply a
weighted average of the rate of return on bonds and the rate of return on stocks. The assets of the
fund (Ws




Changes in these assets are due to ﬁve factors: investment returns (rpWs
fp(t −1)), pension
contributions (Pp = τppHp), pension beneﬁts (Bp), immigration (Wip) and emigration (Wep). It is
assumed that if people emigrate, they take with them all pension rights already built up. On the
other hand, if people immigrate they buy into the pension system, acquiring the same pension
rights as inhabitants of the same age.
Pension liabilities and assets together determine the funding ratio of the pension fund (qf).
The funding ratio is a solvency measure because it expresses the ratio between asset holding and








p is the aggregated stock of pension liabilities.
To determine the uniform contribution rate (τuc), the aggregated accrual of new pension






In a DB arrangement the pension beneﬁt of a retiree of age j is simply equal to the pension
build-up
Bp(j) =Wa
ph(j−1)ψ(j), j ∈ jr,..., je. (2.40)
The pension beneﬁts will be indexed to inﬂation or wage growth.
It may occur that the funding ratio is below the required level. A funding ratio below the
required level must be restored to this level within a period of at most ﬁfteen years. However, if
33 Note, the actual model speciﬁcation is a little bit different to prevent large immediate effects of interest rate shocks. This
effect is distributed over time.
39the funding ratio falls below 105 percent, the pension fund has to raise its funding ratio above
this level within one year. This may be done by either implementing a ‘catching-up’ premium
τcu or by applying cuts to the indexation of pension beneﬁts.
The catching-up premium in GAMMA is chosen in such a way that it minimises the
distorting labour market effects and at the same time restores the funding rate to the required
level within the required time period. The catching-up premium is the solution to a dynamic
optimization problem. Providing a detailed technical derivation of this problem is beyond the
scope of this paper. For that we refer to Bonenkamp (2005). The catching-up premium together
with the cost-effective contribution rate determine the total contribution rate a participant pays to
the DB pension fund.
τpp(t) = τuc(t)+τcu(t) (2.41)
If a pension fund decides to ﬁnance its deﬁcit with a temporary surcharge on the contribution
rate, the burden of the deﬁcit is completely absorbed by the working generations. One can
imagine, for example in an ageing society, that this exerts too much pressure on the ﬁnancial
balances of working people. The instrument of indexation cuts provides a pension fund with a
tool to shift a part of the burden to the retirees.
Indexation cuts mean that existing pension promises of workers and pension beneﬁts of
retirees will not be indexed fully to wages and/or prices. Especially in an average wage scheme,
cutting down indexation is an effective instrument to restore the funding rate. In an average
wage scheme, a pension fund not only cuts down indexation of the pension beneﬁts (as in a ﬁnal
wage scheme), but also the indexation of the pension rights already accumulated by the working
generations.
The pension fund in GAMMA sets indexation cuts as a linear function of the funding ratio.
There exists a lower bound (mostly equal to 100 percent) below which participants get no
indexation to wages and/or prices at all and an upper-bound (135 percent in the ﬁgure) above
which pensioners get full indexation. Between the lower- and upper-bound the indexation
linearly increases with the improvement of the funding ratio.
2.7 Equilibrium and the solution method
2.7.1 Equilibrium
The model has a dynamic general equilibrium solution34 if:
• The allocations are feasible, and all markets clear: i.e. the rows and the columns in Table A.1
must sum up to zero;
34 We use the same deﬁnition as Borsch-Supan et al. (2006).
40• The goods market clears through volume adjustments on the export (import) market. The labour
market clears through demand adjustment of ﬁrms: all labour supply is absorbed by the wages
ﬁrms can pay. Exogenous factors, the goods market price and the user costs of capital determine
the ability to pay (factor price frontier). Equity and bonds surpluses or shortages can be bought
or sold on the international capital market at world market prices. The rate of return on equity
and bonds is exogenously given;
• Capital is put into production such that the marginal productivities of both capital and labour
equal the factor prices according to equation (2.18);
• Firms and households behave optimally and pension funds act according to the rules speciﬁed by
the supervisory organ.
• We get a general equilibrium solution in case we enforce the no-Ponzi game condition. In
particular, we require that the debt to GDP ratio stabilizes.
Unsustainable, or disequilibrium, solutions are obtained if we do not enforce the no-Ponzi game
condition for government ﬁnances.
2.7.2 Solution method
Instead of solving the model for each period consecutively as in the Fair-Taylor method,
GAMMA uses a Stacked-Time method to solve the model for all periods simultaneously.
However, the traditional Stacked-Time method has been made more efﬁcient. Van ’t Veer (2006)
gives further details. Experiments with this solution method show faster convergence than the
Fair-Taylor method.
41423 Data and calibration
Projections and simulations using the GAMMA model are produced by combining the structure
outlined in the previous chapter with real world data and economic parameters. This chapter
elaborates on how these data and parameters are chosen and explains how they are used to
calibrate the model. Section 3.1 shows the values of the circular ﬂow variables for the calibration
year 2006. The assumptions behind the extension of the demographic forecast are explained in
section 3.2. Section 3.3 identiﬁes the values for the exogenous parameters in the household
utility function and presents the consumption and labour participation data for the Netherlands
that are used to calibrate labour supply and Euler equations. Section 3.4 shows how the private
sector labour and capital demand relations are calibrated. Government expenditure and revenue
items are discussed in section 3.5, including the calculation of the age proﬁle of health care
expenditures and assumptions on tax rates. Finally section 3.6 explains the assumed parameter
values of the pension sector.
3.1 Macro-economy
Table 3.1 presents the circular ﬂow ﬁgures for the Dutch economy. These ﬁgures for the year
2006 correspond to the model variables presented in Table A.1. They are used to calibrate the
macro-economic relations in the base path simulation. A cell in the table gives the transactions
of agents on a market (+ receipt, − payment). The aggregated budget constraint of agents is
obtained by adding up over the column: the sum of revenues minus expenditures equals savings.
That is, the column totals are zero.
Table 3.1 Total accounts: circular ﬂow for 2006
House- Pension Capital Government Firms Foreign Row
holds funds Services Taxes Production sector total
Goods − 240.0 − 103.3 − 134.9 59.5 62.9 390.0 − 34.3 0
Investments 103.3 − 15.1 − 88.2 0
Transfers 54.9 − 54.9 0
Labour income 257.0 − 50.4 − 206.6 0
Private pensions 25.7 − 25.7 0
Non-labour income 49.0 18.4 − 12.7 12.0 − 64.8 − 1.9 0
Income taxes − 119.3 119.3 0 0
Proﬁt tax 15.0 − 15.0 0
Private pension premiums − 33.4 33.4 0
Transfers to foreigners − 8.2 8.2 0
Savings(-)/shortage(+) 6.1 − 26.1 7.4 − 15.3 27.9 0
Column total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
433.2 Demography
The demographic model reproduces the population forecast of Statistics Netherlands (See:
De Jong (2005a), De Jong (2005b) and De Jong (2005c)) whose end year is 2050. The mortality
and emigration probabilities and fertility rates are taken from this projection up to the year 2100
and afterwards ﬁxed at their 2100 values. Up to 2100 immigration is set equal to the CBS
projection, and afterwards is ﬁxed at its 2100 value.
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the age distribution of the Dutch population for the years
2006 and 2040. In 2006 the total population size is 16.4 million, of which 24% is younger than
age 20, 61% is between 20 and 64 years old and 15% is older than age 64. The shape of the
population distribution over the age cohorts and gender groups is like a house with an
overhanging pitched roof. In the past the shape of this graph was more like a pyramid: older age
cohorts were smaller than younger cohorts. The overhang is caused by a decline in fertility rates,
during the late nineteen sixties and seventies. Since 1980 fertility rates have been stable. This
has led to rather equal age cohort sizes for those born in recent decades.
Figure 3.1 Age structure of the population in 2006 (left) and 2040 (right)
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The overhang in the distribution consists of the large cohorts between the ages 30 and 59. In the
coming decades these large cohorts will rise in the age pyramid above the age of 65, as the right
part of Figure 3.1 illustrates. The elderly dependency ratio, deﬁned as the number of those aged
65 plus as a percentage of the 20 to 64-year olds (23.4% in 2006) will increase in the future due
to these relatively large cohorts.
This baseline demographic scenario assumes that the total fertility rate remains at about 1.75
over the whole period, and that net immigration increases from its current negative value of
around minus 2,000 annually to a structural level of plus 30,000. Mortality rates continue to
decrease in the future, especially at older ages. As a result, life expectancy will also increase.
Life expectancy at birth will increase from its present level of 76.7 years to 79.6 years for males
44in the period 2005-2050. Similarly, life expectancy at birth for females will increase from its
present level of 81.2 years to 82.6 years in 2050. In the space of 45 years, average life
expectancy overall will thus increase by a good two years. The gain is concentrated at higher
ages: life expectancy at the age of 65 will increase by about 1.5 years.
Table 3.2 Population (millions) and its composition in the period 2006 up to 2100a
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
Age group
0-19 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9
20-64 10.0 9.8 9.2 9.5 9.7
65+ 2.3 3.2 4.0 3.6 3.8
Total 16.4 16.8 17.0 16.9 17.5
Elderly dependency ratio 23.4% 33.0% 43.4% 37.4% 39.6%
a The data apply to the end of the year
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the changes in the age composition of the population that will
be brought about by these developments. The elderly dependency ratio is projected to rise to
43.4% in 2040. After 2040, the ratio stabilises at a more-or-less constant level of around 39%.
The total population will grow to just over 17 million in 2040, and after a dip around 2060, will
rise further to 17.5 million in 2100.
3.3 Households
The GAMMA model speciﬁes 99 as the maximum attainable age. All age cohorts between 0 and
99 are distinguished in the model. Consumption and leisure decisions are made from the age 20
onwards, so consumption of children is attributed to their parents.
The values of the parameters are based on evidence produced by national and international
research. One of the crucial parameters is the substitution elasticity between leisure and
consumption. This has a value of 0.25 (β = 4) and implies that on average the wage elasticity of
labour supply equals 0.14.35 Quite recently, CPB completed a meta-analysis on this parameter
that was used to update the MIMIC model (Evers et al. (2005)). Our value of 0.14 is a little
smaller than the corresponding value in the MIMIC model, but corresponds fairly well with the
results from the meta-analysis.
GAMMA’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution equals 0.5 (γ = 2). Estimates of this
elasticity typically vary widely in the range between zero and one. Research by Epstein and Zin
(1991), which properly distinguishes between the aversion to risk and the aversion to
35 In the labour supply function of GAMMA there is no income effect so the uncompensated and compensated labour
supply elasticities are equivalent.
45intertemporal substitution, conﬁrms this result. Our value of 0.5 is well within their range of
estimated values. The rate of time preference takes a value of 1.3%. This is somewhat higher
than in Altig et al. (2001), and somewhat lower than in Bovenberg and Knaap (2005).
The left side of Figure 3.2 presents labour participation for the year 2006. Age is given on
the horizontal axis of the ﬁgure, while the labour participation, i.e. employment in full-time
equivalencies, l, in percentages of the cohort size, n, is depicted on the vertical axis. The ﬁgure
reveals that labour participation grows between the ages twenty and thirty, stabilizes then up to
age ﬁfty, and decreases afterwards. Labour participation is expected to increase after 2006. This
expected change is based on Euwals and van Vuuren (2005).
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Leisure is deﬁned as the complement of labour participation: v = 1−l/n. This labour
participation proﬁle is calibrated by inverting equation (2.7) which gives the ratio of the
parameters αv and αc as functions of leisure and the relative price of leisure.
The right hand side of ﬁgure 3.2 gives the consumption proﬁle for 2006. This proﬁle is based
on estimates of Ree and Alessie (2007). Their estimates point to small differences between the
life cycle proﬁles and cross section proﬁles in the period 1978-2001. This justiﬁes our use of
their (life cycle) estimates as a cross section proﬁle. Above the age 75 the consumption level is
assumed to be constant. Age is presented on the horizontal axis of the ﬁgure, while consumption
is measured on the vertical axis. Consumption at the age 20 is scaled to one.
For the base run we assume that this consumption proﬁle holds. This consumption proﬁle
together with total wealth imply a consumption level over the life cycle. The parameters αc are
used to calibrate this consumption level. More precisely: the Euler equation for total
consumption can be obtained by dividing two equations from the equation set (2.8). This Euler
equation can be written in such a form that the parameter αc becomes a function of leisure and
consumption.
463.4 Firms























The aggregated efﬁciency index is ﬁxed at one in the calibration year. This assumption makes
employment and wages in efﬁciency units equal to the actual employment and wage rate. The
capital stock growth equals the employment growth in efﬁciency units in case of constant
relative factor prices (see equation (2.18)). Constant relative factor prices hold in equilibrium.












The technical rate of deterioration is set equal to depreciation ide relative to the capital stock.
Investment ﬂuctuates a lot over the business cycle so we use steady state values of investment
and the growth rate of employment to calibrate the capital stock and the rate of deterioration.
This implies that the actual investment levels are not reproduced by our model.
The equity premium rep = rs −rb is exogenous.36 Mathur and Hassett (2006) have
investigated the relationship between the proﬁt tax and the wage rate for 72 countries over 22
years. They found that an increase of the proﬁt tax leads to a drop in wages. According to our
wage equation this implies that the tax system is not neutral in most countries. More speciﬁcally








This holds also in GAMMA because the ﬁscal depreciation rate (ν) is calibrated at a value
0.048, the repayment fraction (ρ0) at 0.038, the fraction (ρ1) of new investment ﬁnanced with
new debt at 0.70, and the rate of return on shares (rs) at 0.066.
In the model, private sector production includes an exogenous element in the base year in
order to conform to data. Exogenous production includes, amongst other things, exploitation of
natural gas reserves and a production surplus. The production surplus is deﬁned as the observed
production in factor costs minus wage and capital costs in the base year. Capital costs are based
on the assumption for the market rate of return. An extended explanation can be found in
Van Ewijk et al. (2006).
36 The model does not take into account the disutility of risk. Since the portfolio decision of housholds is also exogenous,
the model uses, in fact, one uniform market rate of return. This market rate of return is also used as the discount rate.
473.5 Government
3.5.1 Tax rates
As outlined in section 2.5 tax bases in GAMMA include: household income (including wages,
public and private pensions, transfers, and income from asset wealth), private consumption,
private investments and corporate proﬁts as well as a number of miscellaneous tax sources. The
tax rates for each of these bases is calibrated simply by dividing aggregate tax receipts for tax







Apart from one exception we ignore progression in tax rates. Differences in average incomes
across age groups therefore do not lead to differences in tax rates. This reﬂects the fact that, for
these tax bases, the progression is relatively low. Moreover, as tax brackets are assumed to
increase in line with productivity (rather than inﬂation only), the working of progression in the
increase of tax revenues is fully eliminated. The taxation of pension incomes, however, does
feature a sharp progression due to the fact that the tax rates in the ﬁrst two tax brackets are very
low for individuals over the age of 65. This is taken account of by imputing a progression factor
of 1.8. As average pensions are projected to rise at a (slightly) higher pace than productivity this
progression factor is effective.
3.5.2 Expenditure proﬁles
The aggregated age proﬁle of health care expenditures is taken from The Institute for Medical
Technology Assessment (iMTA). Important for the decomposition of the age proﬁle of health
expenditure into the age proﬁles of survivors and decedents is the age proﬁle of decedents, i.e.
the age proﬁle of death-related costs. Here, we used data from Polder and Achterberg (2004)).
These data pertain to the year 1999, which is quite recent for the purpose at hand. When
disaggregated to acute and long-term care, the acute component is decreasing in age and the
long-term care component is increasing in age. This pattern corresponds to what others have
found for different countries.
We do not want to use the data in their raw form, however. The reason is that they measure
costs in the last year of life. There is a great deal of evidence that indicates that death-related
costs occur in a time period that is much longer than a year. Therefore, we multiply these ﬁgures
by a blow-up factor. Note that this implicitly suggests that the ratio between costs in the last year
of life and total death-related costs is the same for people of different age. To get a blow-up
factor, we analysed four papers that presented data on death-related costs: WRR (1997),
Seshamani and Gray (2004), Roos et al. (1987), and Jones (2002). The values for the blow-up
factor that we calculated were 2.6, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.7 respectively. We took the average of these
numbers: 2.45.
48Given the age proﬁle of death-related costs, the age proﬁle of survivors follows from calibrating
the age proﬁle of total health expenditure (the weighted average of the age proﬁles of survivors
and decedents) to statistics.
The age proﬁles of social security expenditures (public pensions, disability beneﬁts,
unemployment beneﬁts, social assistance) are taken from SCP (1994).37
3.5.3 Aggregate expenditures and revenues
Table 3.3 presents the government budget for 2006 in percentages of GDP, with the left hand
side of the table showing expenditures and the right hand side revenues. Most of these budgetary
items are age related. In the case of expenditures, children receive education and child
allowances while elderly people receive social security and higher health care beneﬁts. Beneﬁts
from social security rise with age mainly due to public pensions (AOW) which are paid to
citizens over the age of 65, and disability beneﬁts, which increase with age for those younger
than 65. Health care costs rise with age because of the growing costs of illness and provisions
for the elderly.
Table 3.3 Public ﬁnances in 2006 in % GDP
Expenditures Revenues
Social security 12.0 Income tax and social security contributions 21.8
- of which public pensions 4.7 Indirect and other commodity taxes 14.9
Health care 8.8 Corporate income tax 2.6
Education 5.4 Natural gas revenues 1.6
Other expenditure excluding interest payments 19.2 Other income 5.2
Interest payments 2.5 Total 46.1
Total 47.8
EMU balance − 1.7
EMU debt a 54.4
a Value at the end of the year
Items on the revenue side are also age related. Older workers pay more tax than retirees. Until
the age of about 50, labour incomes (and hence tax revenues from these incomes) rise with age.
Beyond the age of 50, tax payments fall due to gradually decreasing participation in the labour
force. The declining labour incomes are not fully offset by various forms of pension income,
which are also subject to income tax. Accordingly, income taxes fall with age.
37 The distribution of average expenditure per individual over age groups is derived from data that usually apply to a past
year. These data, which are provided by more specialized institutes as SCP and iMtA have to be updated in order to be
consistent with the aggregate expenditure level in the base year. This updating procedure is carried out in a two stage
process. In the ﬁrst stage we calculate the aggregate level of the expenditure item that results from combining the original
(‘raw’) data from the institutes with the age composition of the population in the base year. Then in the second stage, this
result is compared with the actual forecast. The relative difference between these two aggregate ﬁgures is subsequently
used to adjust the original data on the distribution over individuals.
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net benefits
The cumulative effect of the age proﬁles of revenues and burdens is shown in Figure 3.3 as the
net beneﬁts received by individuals from the government sector. It can be seen that, on the
balance of beneﬁts and burdens, it turns out that the young and the elderly are net beneﬁciaries
from the government and the middle-aged are net contributors.
3.6 Pensions
We used as default an average-pay pension scheme. Because the build up of pension rights is
linear, namely 2.25% (aa
p) of the pension wage per year worked, our pension scheme aims at a
replacement rate of 90% of average pay after 40 years of service (this includes the surviving
relatives’ pension). Not all workers build up occupational pensions in the Netherlands. Mostly
self-employed workers do not participate in collective pension arrangements. We assume that
90% of the workers have occupational pensions (ε). The existence of the ﬂat-rate public pension,
the AOW, is taken into account by the pension fund through a franchise. Only workers with a
wage above this franchise build up an occupational pension. The recent decline in the franchise
in response to the disappearance of early retirement schemes is taken into account. In the base
year (2006) the franchise (fp) is set at 10,000 euro.
Most pension funds in the Netherlands aim at wage- or price indexation. This is not
guaranteed, however, but is conditional on the ﬁnancial position of the fund (funding ratio).
Many pension funds have recently introduced more explicit indexation rules, providing for
example no indexation at all if the funding ratio is below a certain lower bound, full indexation if
50the funding ratio is above an upper bound, and a linear cut in indexation for ratios in-between.
Our average pension fund aims at a mixture of wage- (65%) and price indexation (35%), and
gives full indexation at a funding ratio of 135% of the nominal liabilities (equivalent to about
95% of the indexed liabilities) or more. No indexation is given if the funding ratio is below
100% of nominal liabilities (70% of indexed liabilities).
Table 3.4 summarizes the parameter values in the GAMMA model for 2006.
Table 3.4 Exogenous variable and parameter values in the GAMMA model for 2006
Symbol Value
Growth and interest rates
Productivity growth rate (%) - 1.7
Inﬂation rate (%) - 2.0
Nominal bond rate (%) rb 3.5
Equity premium (%) rep 3.1
Households
Intertemporal substitution elasticity 1/γ 0.5
Rate of time preference (%) δ 1.3
Price elasticity of leisure demand 1/β 0.25
Fraction of ﬁnancial wealth held in bonds (%) - 50
Firms
Substitution elasticity between labour and capital σ 0.5
Fiscal depreciation rate of capital (%) ν 4.8
Technical depreciation rate of capital (%) φ 3.8
Fraction of debt repaid in each period (%) ρ0 3.8
Fraction of new investment ﬁnanced with new debt (%) ρ1 70
Pension sector
Target funding ratio qf 1.35
Pension rights accumulation rate (%) ap 2.3
Fraction of workers with occupational pensions (%) ε 90
Tax rates
Labour income (%) a τli 34.1
Consumption (%) τin 27.4
Transfer income (%) τsb 10.4
Pension income (%) τr 19.8
Firm proﬁts (%) τp 30.4
Household wealth (%) b - 0.6
a includes public pension contribution
b imputed income from wealth is 4%
51524 Baseline projection
The next two chapters of this document present and discuss the output for a variety of GAMMA
simulations. This chapter deals with the baseline projection, assuming unchanged institutions.
This is the same projection as that presented in Van Ewijk et al. (2006) that shows that without
corrective budgetary reforms, Dutch public ﬁnances are on an unsustainable path.38 Section 4.1
describes ﬁscal developments and section 4.2 describes the macroeconomic developments in the
baseline.
4.1 Budgetary developments
Table 4.1 presents how public ﬁnances develop in our projection for the period 2006-2100. Until
2040 the demographic changes exert upward pressure on public expenditure by raising the costs
of public pensions and health care by 4.1% and 4.3% of GDP respectively. In addition, natural
gas revenues will decrease in this period by 1.5% of GDP as a result of the depletion of gas
reserves. At the same time however, there are alleviating factors. First, tax revenues will increase
through rising pension incomes that are subject to income taxation. First plus second pillar
pension incomes will rise in the period until 2040 by 8.5% points of GDP (from 9.0% to 17.5%
of GDP). This raises tax revenues from this source (both direct and indirect) by 4.1% of GDP.
Second, expenditure on disability schemes is expected to fall considerably due to policy reforms
that were implemented in recent years. On balance however, the burdening factors outweigh the
alleviating factors. After an initial improvement due to cyclical factors, the primary balance
deteriorates after 2011 as ageing and the decline of revenues from natural gas hit the budget. This
eventually translates into declining EMU balances and eventually an explosion of public debt
levels and interest payments. This in turn illustrates that government ﬁnances are currently on an
unsustainable path and corrective measures are required to render public ﬁnances sustainable.
Total debt (the sum of the statutory debt and the implicit debt due to ageing and declining gas
revenues) is about two times annual GDP. The corresponding sustainability gap amounts to 2.6%
of GDP. This means that a permanent reduction in material government consumption by 2.6% of
GDP starting in 2006 would sufﬁce to fully restore ﬁscal sustainability. Pursuing this policy
reform would lead to an improvement of government balances which in turn would reduce debt
and interest payments and make it possible to cover the future costs of ageing. Table 4.2 shows
how public ﬁnances are affected if a permanent reduction in material government consumption is
adopted to achieve ﬁscal sustainability. Primary expenditure is reduced by 2.6% of GDP and the
primary balance improves accordingly. As a result, the EMU balance improves. Next, the ratio
38 Statistics Netherlands has updated the demographic forecast used in Van Ewijk et al. (2006) to allow for higher
expected lifespans (see http://www.cpb.nl/nl/pub/cpbreeksen/notitie/05mrt2007_2/notitie.pdf). Here we retain the previous
projection in order to reproduce the same baseline simulation.
53Table 4.1 Public ﬁnances in the baseline projection
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
% GDP
Expenditure
Social security 12.0 13.5 15.5 14.5 14.9
- public pensions 4.7 6.6 8.8 7.8 8.2
- disability beneﬁts 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6
- unemployment beneﬁts 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
- other beneﬁts 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1
Health care 8.8 10.3 13.1 12.5 12.6
Education 5.4 5.4 5.8 5.7 5.8
Other expenditure excluding interest payments 19.2 18.4 18.2 18.3 18.3
Interest payments 2.5 1.5 2.5 4.2 7.2
Primary expenditure 45.3 47.8 52.5 51.0 51.5
Total 47.8 49.3 55.0 55.2 58.7
Revenues
Income tax and social security contributions 21.8 23.7 25.3 24.9 25.2
- of which on pension income 1.8 2.5 3.6 3.4 3.6
Indirect and other taxation 14.9 15.9 17.3 16.7 16.8
- of which on consumption by population aged 65 and older 1.9 2.9 4.2 3.6 3.7
Corporate income tax 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3
Natural gas revenues 1.6 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0
Other income 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.7 4.4
Total 46.1 48.1 50.0 48.6 48.8
EMU balance − 1.7 − 1.1 − 5.1 − 6.6 − 9.9
Primary EMU balance 0.7 0.4 − 2.6 − 2.4 − 2.7
EMU debt a 54.4 41.0 74.5 126.4 213.3
a Value at the end of the year
of debt to GDP shows a sharp decline and eventually becomes negative. The burden of interest
payments develops accordingly. Eventually, government balances and debt levels stabilise at a
constant ratio relative to GDP.39
4.2 Economic development in the baseline projection
Table 4.3 shows the development of a number of macroeconomic variables in the period
2006-2100. Notably, the share of consumption (private and public) in GDP increases strongly in
this period. This share peaks around 2040, after which it decreases somewhat. This reﬂects the
39 We use a discount rate equal to the average market rate of return for the determination of the sustainability gap.This
does not imply that we also assume that the government actually ﬁnances its debt at this rate. Indeed, the bond tate is
relevant for the rate at which the government ﬁnances its debt. (See Van Ewijk et al. (2006), page 54-56 for more
information)
54Table 4.2 Public ﬁnances in the sustainable projection (material public consumption reduced to achieve ﬁscal
sustainability)
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
% GDP
Expenditure
Primary expenditure 42.7 45.2 50.0 48.4 49.0
Interest payments 2.5 0.1 − 0.7 − 0.4 − 0.4
Total 45.2 45.3 49.3 48.0 48.6
Revenues 46.1 48.1 50.0 48.6 48.8
EMU balance 1.0 2.9 0.6 0.7 0.2
Primary EMU balance 3.4 3.0 − 0.0 0.2 − 0.2
EMU debt a 51.7 0.6 − 19.4 − 12.9 − 10.2
a Value at the end of the year
changing age structure of the population. Current saving levels are high and national wealth is
built up through a surplus in the current account. Gradually, savings will decrease and
consumption will increase relative to production when the share of elderly in terms of the
working population starts to grow. The rapid increase in pensions that accompanies ageing
results in an increase in the share of private consumption in GDP. Also, the share of government
consumption in GDP increases in the projection. The increase occurs primarily after 2020 as a
result of the comparatively strong growth in demand for health care. In 2040, the share of
government consumption in GDP - especially as a result of rising expenditure on health care - is
higher by 4.1% points in the baseline projection than in 2006. Finally, corporate investment also
outpaces GDP in the projection in the period 2006-2040. The increase in corporate investment
occurs entirely in the years 2020-2040. Up to 2020, there is an adverse effect on corporate
investment from the slowdown in the growth of labour supply available for businesses. At a
given capital intensity of the production process, a lower investment rate is required (in line with
diminished employment growth). Overall, national spending increases more strongly than GDP.
As a result, the surplus on the balance of trade deteriorates. Nonetheless, the Netherlands will
realise very considerable surpluses in international trade in the coming decades. On the basis of
sustainable policy, the trade balance surplus is expected to be 9.4% of GDP in 2006. That
surplus is substantially greater than that of the baseline projection without budgetary measures,
because the decrease in material government consumption implies a decline in national
consumption. The international trade balance surplus gradually decreases in the projection and
swings into a deﬁcit as from around 2030. This eventually results in an international trade
balance deﬁcit of 4.9% of GDP in 2040, which gradually diminishes in subsequent years.
55Table 4.3 Economic development on the basis of sustainable policies
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
% GDP
GDP components
Wage income 50.1 52.8 52.6 53.0 52.9
Net other income 23.2 19.0 18.2 18.3 18.3
Depreciation 14.8 15.3 15.2 15.2 15.2
Indirect taxes less subsidies 11.6 12.6 13.8 13.4 13.4
Gross domestic product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Components of national consumption
Private consumption 46.8 50.9 54.6 52.8 53.1
Government consumption 23.6 24.8 27.8 27.1 27.3
Corporate investment 17.5 17.2 20.0 19.5 19.7
Government investment 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
National consumption 90.6 95.5 104.9 102 102.6
Balance of trade surplus 9.4 4.5 − 4.9 − 2.0 − 2.6
Balance of primary revenues from abroad 0.4 3.2 4.5 3.9 4.6
Balance of secondary revenues from abroad − 1.6 − 1.5 − 1.5 − 1.5 − 1.5
Balance of current foreign transactions 8.2 6.2 − 1.9 0.4 0.5
Net foreign assets a,b 0 76.1 103.1 86.3 104.9
Gross national product c 100.4 103.2 104.5 103.9 104.6
a Increase compared to 2006.
b Value at the end of the year.
c GDP plus balance of primary revenues from abroad.
565 Simulations
This chapter presents the results of three sets of simulations that demonstrate the workings of
GAMMA. The ﬁrst set (section 5.1) shows how the outcomes of the model are inﬂuenced by
various alternative demographic assumptions. Since demographic developments are largely out
of the control of the government, they are of particular interest for the projection of public
ﬁnances. For these simulations we present the resulting unsustainable development and the
change of the sustainability gap (see section 2.5.2 for a precise deﬁnition of the sustainability
gap). The last two sets of simulations present the results of policy reforms, to the tax system
(section 5.2) and the pension system (section 5.3) respectively. In these simulations, it is shown
how household behavioural reactions are motivated by price changes caused by the reforms. In
addition, the reforms will be assessed with respect to their efﬁciency and intergenerational
consequences.40
Presenting these results as we do here, demonstrates the usefulness of the GAMMA model as
a policy analysis tool: its results are intuitively understandable and straightforward to explain.
5.1 Demographic shocks
In this section, we present the results of three simulations that apply shocks to the baseline
demographic projection. The shocks include: a permanent decrease in death rates, a permanent
increase in the fertility rate and a permanent increase in immigration rates.41 In order to draw
comparisons between the scenarios, all three have been calibrated such that they all result in total
population projections for the year 2041 that are 4.4% higher than in the baseline. (4.4% is half a
standard deviation of the distribution in 2041 of population projections for the Netherlands
produced by the PEP program. See Alho and Spencer (1997)). However, since each shock
inﬂuences the demographic makeup of the population in a different way, they will have differing
effects on the economy, the government’s budget balance and the position of the pension sector.
The left hand side of Figure 5.1 shows the time series projections of the total population from
the three shock simulations as well as from the baseline projection. The calibration has enforced
that the short-run consequences of each scenario are quite similar. However, after 2041 the
population projections start to diverge once multiplier effects in the fertility and immigration
shock scenarios kick in. In the mortality shock scenario, the population stabilizes by 2040 and
begins to decline slightly thereafter.
The most relevant demographic statistic for government ﬁnance is the elderly dependency
40 Appendix E investigates the homogeneity of the model for inﬂation, population growth and productivity growth.
41 The immigration shock could also be interpreted as simulation of a decrease in emigration rates. Since the population
model of GAMMA makes no relevant distinction between immigants and emigrants, decreasing emigration is equivalent to
increasing immigration.
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ratio, the number of pensioners divided by the number of potential workers. The right hand side
of Figure 5.1 shows how each of the shocks affects the ratio differently. It can be seen that the
largest divergence from the baseline occurs in the mortality shock scenario. Obviously, a
decrease in the mortality rate would increase the number of retirees in the population while
having very little effect on the number of workers. The positive fertility shock would have a
slightly negative effect on the dependency ratio, although this would only occur after twenty
years when the relatively larger cohorts reach working age. The immigration shock would also
have a slightly negative effect, due to the speciﬁcation of the age proﬁle of immigrants. The
majority of immigrants are of working age, so increasing the net immigration rate would
increase the workforce.
The differing demographic implications of each of these scenarios will have consequences
for the macroeconomy, the pension sector and government ﬁnances. In the following sections we
address the consequences of each shock individually.
5.1.1 Mortality shock
Increased longevity will cause the elderly dependency ratio to stabilize at a much higher level
than it is currently. In order to isolate the economic and budgetary effects of longer life spans,
we present the outcomes of a mortality shock scenario in Table 5.1. The scenario simulates an
increase of the expected lifespan by 3.4 years. The increase in lifespan has the effect of
increasing the present value of future pension beneﬁts to households, since the expected period
of receiving beneﬁts is now longer. This in turn increases the price of leisure, motivating less
leisure demand (more labour supply) at the cohort level. The increase in the price of leisure
occurs despite a rise in the average pension premium needed to cover the now higher liabilities
of the pension system. The pension system subsidizes labour supply since pension beneﬁts are
taxed at a lower rate than labour income. Thus, the greater scope of the pension system due to
the mortality shock increases the price of leisure. Despite this, the long-run aggregate demand
for leisure increases due to a larger proportion of retirees in the population. This can be seen in
Table 5.1: the aggregate leisure demand is a weighted average over the entire population
58Table 5.1 Economic and ﬁscal effects of a decrease in mortality rates
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
Price of leisure (%) 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.8
Tax wedge (D) − 0.3 − 0.4 − 0.3 − 0.4 − 0.5
Average pension premium 1.3 2.1 2.4 2.1 1.9
Leisure demand (weighted average) (%) − 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
- of twenty year-olds (%) − 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 − 0.1
- of fourty year-olds (%) − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.2
- of sixty year-olds (%) − 0.2 − 0.2 − 0.2 − 0.3 − 0.3
Employment level (%) 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5
Household savings (% GDP) (D) 1.5 0.8 − 0.1 − 0.1 0.1
Private consumption (% GDP) (D) − 1.6 − 0.4 1.1 1.4 1.3
Corporate investment (% GDP) (D) 0.1 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Government consumption (% GDP) (D) − 0.1 0.9 2.0 2.2 2.0
National consumption (% GDP) (D) − 1.6 0.6 3.1 3.5 3.2
Production (GDP in market prices) (%) − 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.9
Primary government expenditures (% GDP) (D) − 0.1 1.7 3.4 3.6 3.3
Government revenues (% GDP) (D) − 0.5 − 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.7
Sustainability gap (D) 2.5
including both retirees (whose leisure demand is scaled to the maximum by deﬁnition) and
workers (whose leisure demand decreases). The long run increase in the proportion of retirees in
the population causes this weighted average to increase despite the decease in leisure demand for
workers at the cohort level. Longer lifespans also motivate an adjustment of goods consumption
behaviour. Since they expect to live longer, households save a larger share of their working-age
income for retirement.
At the aggregate level, the general employment level increases due to the increase in the
price of leisure. The increase in employment is matched by an increase in private investment and
the GDP is now larger due to the shock. Private consumption as a percentage of GDP falls in the
short run because households initally must save because of the unexpected increase in their
lifespans. Over the long run, however, longer lifespans mean that there is a permanently higher
proportion of retirees in the population who consume more than they produce in any given year.
In addition, the increase in the old-age dependency ratio drives up government spending on
public pensions and health care. As a result, national consumption42 as a percentage of GDP
increases, meaning that longer lifespans would require a reversal of the current account surplus
in the long run.
The ﬁscal effects of the shock are negative. Despite the fact that government revenues as a
percentage of GDP increase due to higher tax receipts from labour income and indirect taxes,
42 Deﬁned as the sum of household and government consumption plus private and public investment.
59greater spending on health care and public pension exacerbate the ﬁscal imbalance. The result of
the shock is an increase of the sustainability gap of 2.5% of GDP.
5.1.2 Fertility shock
In this section we study the effects of a permanent increase in fertility rates from 2006 onward
by 10%.43 Table 5.2 shows the outcomes. In contrast to the mortality shock scenario there is
Table 5.2 Economic and ﬁscal effects of an increase in fertility rates
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
Price of leisure (%) 0.0 0.0 − 0.8 − 0.5 − 0.7
Tax wedge (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Average pension premium 0.0 0.0 − 0.2 − 0.1 0.1
Leisure demand (weighted average) (%) 0.0 0.0 − 0.5 − 1.5 − 0.7
- of twenty year-olds (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- of fourty year-olds (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- of sixty year-olds (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Employment level (%) 0.0 0.0 3.2 8.3 18.5
Household savings (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 0.1 0.0
Private consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.0 − 0.2 − 0.9 − 0.9
Corporate investment (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.1 0.7
Government consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 − 0.1
National consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.2 − 0.2
Production (GDP in market prices) (%) 0.0 0.0 2.4 7.6 17.6
Primary government expenditures (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.3 0.2 − 0.5 − 0.6
Government revenues (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.0 − 0.2 − 0.6 − 0.6
Sustainability gap (D) 0.2
almost no inﬂuence from increased fertility on the price of leisure at the cohort level as is
illustrated by the leisure demand effects at the cohort level. Thus, at the cohort level, the shock
does not have a signiﬁcant effect on household behaviour. However, after 2026, when the new
relatively larger cohorts begin to join the workforce, there is an increase in the general
employment level, accompanied by increases in private investment and gross domestic
production. These effects are compounded over time because the larger cohorts begin to have
proportionally more children themselves as they reach child-bearing ages.
There is also very little effect of higher fertility on public ﬁnances. In the medium run, there
is an increase in public expenditures due to higher spending on education expenditures as
expressed in percentages of GDP. Government revenue as a share of GDP changes temporarily
as a result of the shock. The combined effect is a slight deterioration of the government’s ﬁscal
43 For example the fertility rate in 2006 for the 25-year-old cohort increases from .0672 to .0739.
60position. However, sustainability could be restored with a budgetary adjustment of just 0.2%
points of GDP.
That the increase in fertility actually makes the long run budgetary shortfall slightly worse
can be explained by the fact that, on balance, individuals derive net beneﬁts from the government
over the course of their lifetimes. That is to say, viewed over the entire lifetime of a given
individual, the discounted tax and premiums remitted to the government is lower than the
discounted value of public expenditure from which that individual beneﬁts. Therefore, a higher
number of individuals in the population due to an increase in fertility will erode the ﬁscal
position of the government, other things being equal.
5.1.3 Immigration shock
Table 5.3 gives the results of the immigration shock scenario that permanently decreases
emigration rates in 2006 by 23%. As with the fertility shock scenario, higher net immigration
Table 5.3 Economic and ﬁscal effects of an increase in immigration rates
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
Price of leisure (%) − 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3
Tax wedge (D) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Average pension premium (D) 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1
Leisure demand (weighted average) (%) 0.0 − 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.5
- of twenty year-olds (%) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
- of fourty year-olds (%) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
- of sixty year-olds (%) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Employment level (%) 0.0 2.9 5.9 6.0 5.6
Household savings (% GDP) (D) − 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private consumption (% GDP) (D) − 0.1 − 0.3 − 0.5 0.1 0.4
Corporate investment (% GDP) (D) 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0
Government consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.0 − 0.2 − 0.5 − 0.2 0.0
National consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.6 0.2 − 0.8 − 0.2 0.3
Production (GDP in market prices) (%) 0.1 2.9 6.1 6.4 6.1
Primary government expenditures (% GDP) (D) 0.0 − 0.4 − 0.8 − 0.2 0.2
Government revenues (% GDP) (D) 0.0 − 0.2 − 0.3 0.1 0.2
Sustainability gap (D) − 0.2
results in only very small variations in the price of leisure, and so behavioural reactions at the
cohort level are insigniﬁcant. The aggregated economic impacts of the immigration shock mirror
those of the fertility scenario except that the impacts are more immmediate. Employment
increases due to the larger population, which in turn increases production.
It is apparent that the immigration shock has relatively little effect on public ﬁnances. In the
beginning of the simulation period the main expenditure categories are slightly lower as
61percentages of GDP but only because production has increased by a greater magnitude due to a
relatively larger workforce. Indeed, revenues as percentages of GDP also decrease in the short
run for the same reason, but by not as much as expenditures. After 2040, tax revenues begin to
increase. As a result, there is a small favourable development in the budget balance relative to
the baseline. The sustainability gap as represented by the necessary budget adjustment is then
negative (-0.2% of GDP), indicating that increased net immigration relieves the ﬁscal problem to
some degree. However, compared to the positive necessary adjustment of 2.6% of GDP in the
baseline scenario of chapter 4, decreasing emigration by 23% doesn’t even come close to
compensating for the demographic imbalance.
Note that this result must be qualiﬁed. By assumption, immigrants and emigrants in the
GAMMA model are taken to be representative of the native cohort to which they belong. That is,
there is no difference in terms of economic behaviour between immigrants and non-immigrants
of the same age. In the real world, however, this seems not to be true. Immigrants, on average,
have a lower level of labour force participation and wages than non-immigrants (see Ter Rele
(2003)). Taking this fact into account would change the story considerably. In fact, encouraging
immigration may make budgetary pressures worse if immigrants consume as much government
expenditure as natives but provide less government revenue.
5.2 Tax reforms
5.2.1 Choice of tax base
The preferred choice of tax base has been the subject of investigation for applied general
equilibrium models since their inception (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)). It is taken for
granted that governments satisfy revenue requirements using distortionary taxes. By deﬁnition,
distortionary taxes alter the economic behaviour of agents and erode the tax base. The relative
efﬁciency of a particular tax depends not just on the the extent of the marginal economic
distortion it creates but also the size of its base. For instance, a widely based tax spreads out the
burden over more agents allowing the tax rate to be relatively low. Since tax distortions are
judged to be convex in tax rates (Barro (1979)), a widely based tax will result in a lower
aggregate distortion, all else being equal.
The GAMMA model is well-equipped to evaluate the efﬁciency of various tax instruments.
Tax revenues are collected from a variety of sources including consumption, labour income,
transfer income, asset income, pension income (public and private) and ﬁrms’ proﬁts. In
addition, the effects of tax reforms can be simulated dynamically and not just at the instant the
reform takes place.
In the simulation results presented here, we start from the sustainable projection presented in
chapter 4 and roll back tax rates on total household income (exclusive of income from wealth)
by ten percent (thus an equal relative change). Tax rates are then increased respectively on total
62pension income (public and private), labour income, and consumption in order to sustain the
budget.44 So this analysis is concerned with the effects of the trade-off involved in switching
from one tax base to another. We look at both the efﬁciency and equity effects of the tax base
change. As a measure of the efﬁciency effects of taxation, we use the long-run employment
change as well as the aggregate utility change (measured as equivalent variations) resulting from
the policy reform. The equity effects of taxation are measured by the distribution of utility
changes over the age cohorts.
The switch to the tax solely on labour income results in a decrease in the price of leisure of
just under 1% (Table 5.4). This occurs on the balance of two effects. First, the tax rate on
pension income is reduced, resulting in an increase in the marginal beneﬁt from supplying labour
attributable to future pension beneﬁts. Second, the tax on labour income is increased which
decreases the marginal beneﬁt of supplying labour attributable to the current wage. The latter
effect outweighs the former. Due to the net decrease in the price of leisure, labour supply at both
the cohort level and the macroeconomic level is reduced. Household goods consumption also
decreases slightly over the long run because of the loss of net income caused by the reform for all
cohorts except those who are presently retired or close to retirement. Those households beneﬁt
more from the reduction in pension taxes than they suffer from the increase in wage taxes.
Table 5.4 Economic effects of a switch from a tax on total income to a tax on labour income
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
Price of leisure (%) − 0.9 − 0.8 − 0.8 − 0.8 − 0.8
Goods price (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tax wedge (D) 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Average pension premium (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Leisure demand (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Employment level (%) − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Household savings (% GDP) (D) − 0.5 − 0.5 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.2
Private consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.3 0.2 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1
Corporate investment (% GDP) (D) − 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
National consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.1 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1
Production (GDP in market prices) (%) 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
So a reform towards increased wage taxation is unambiguously distortionary, since the general
employment level decreases by 0.1%. In this case, we have decreased taxes on two bases,
transfers and pensions, that are relatively inelastic and increased taxes on a base that is directly
44 These experiments are similar to those presented in chapter 5 of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). In those simulations,
the income tax was replaced entirely by taxes on wage income, consumption and capital income. Rather than imposing a
long-run sustainability constraint as is done here, Auerbach and Kotlikoff impose a balanced budget constraint: that is, a
constant stream of annual tax revenue.
63affected by the tax rate through the wage elasticity of labour supply. Naturally the distortionary
effect of the tax reform compounds itself: the distortion increases the aggregate tax burden
which in turn increases the distortion.
Table 5.5 Economic effects of a switch from a tax on income to a tax on pension beneﬁts
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
Price of leisure (%) 2.7 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.4
Goods price (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tax wedge (D) − 1.8 − 1.6 − 1.7 − 1.6 − 1.7
Average pension premium (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Leisure demand (%) − 0.6 − 0.5 − 0.6 − 0.5 − 0.5
Employment level (%) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Household savings (% GDP) (D) 2.0 1.9 1.0 1.0 0.9
Private consumption (% GDP) (D) − 1.2 − 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.3
Corporate investment (% GDP) (D) 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
National consumption (% GDP) (D) − 0.1 − 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3
Production (GDP in market prices) (%) 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4
In the case of replacing the total income tax with the tax on pension beneﬁts (Table 5.5), the
pension income tax has a large lump sum component: there is no labour supply reaction from
presently retired cohorts resulting from the decrease in net pension receipts. For working-age
cohorts the marginal beneﬁt of working is reduced by lowering future net beneﬁts, however this
effect is more than offset by the increase in net wages resulting from the decrease in wage taxes.
The reduction in the tax on labour income removes some of the distortion it caused in the base
run scenario. So the shift of the burden to a tax base that is less affected by behavioural reactions
decreases the distortions as measured by the long-run employment increase of 0.3%.
There is a short-run decrease in household goods consumption brought about by two factors.
First, retired households see their net income decrease unexpectedly, and so they have less
lifetime wealth from which to ﬁnance consumption. Second, working households must save
more for retirement due to the increased tax on pension income. Over the long run, however,
these effects subside and the efﬁciency of the reform is revealed by both by the long run increase
in GDP and in household goods consumption as a percentage of GDP.
The consumption tax is also revealed to be more efﬁcient than the tax on total income (Table
5.6). In this scenario there are inﬂuences on two prices which are relevant for household
behaviour. First, the price of leisure is increased by over 4% due to a reduction of tax rates on
labour and pension income. Second, the price of goods consumption is increased by 3.6% due to
the higher indirect tax rate. As in the previous simulations the increase in the price of leisure
stimulates household labour supply. In the short run, goods consumption decreases for those
cohorts already in retirement or approaching retirement due to the unexpected loss of wealth in
64Table 5.6 Economic effects of a switch from a tax on income to a tax on consumption
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
Price of leisure (%) 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2
Goods price (%) 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
Tax wedge (D) − 0.4 − 0.4 − 0.4 − 0.4 − 0.4
Average pension premium (D) 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Leisure demand (%) − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.1 − 0.2
Employment level (%) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Household savings (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Private consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1
Corporate investment (% GDP) (D) − 0.4 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3
Government consumption (% GDP) (D) − 0.3 − 0.4 − 0.5 − 0.5 − 0.5
National consumption (% GDP) (D) − 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Production (GDP in market prices) (%) 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.8
real terms. However, for presently young and future cohorts, goods consumption increases as a
result of the reform. At a glace, this seems counterintuitive since the price of goods consumption
is now higher. However, counter-acting the price effect is an income effect: labour supply is
increased which motivates and allows for increased goods consumption.
Why does the income effect dominate the price effect in this scenario? Because increasing
indirect taxes shifts the burden in part to those who are presently retired, the reform is able to tax
the existing wealth of those households. Since taxing wealth that has already been accumulated
results in no behavioural feedback, the excess burden from taxation is decreased. So the increase
in the consumption tax rate that must replace the decrease in the income rate can be less than it
would be otherwise. The result of the reform is an increase in employment by 0.1% to increase
the lifetime consumption possibilities of workers. So the shift to consumption taxation implies
an efﬁciency increase.
5.2.2 Welfare effects of tax reforms
In addition to the overall effects on efﬁciency of the tax reforms, switching between tax bases
will have redistributional effects among generations. Figure 5.2 shows the equivalent variations
for individuals by year of birth for the three tax policy simulations relative to the total income
tax scenario.45
It can be seen that the switch to the tax on pension income has a very large negative impact on
the welfare of those households who are presently retired. The cohort born in 1941 experiences
45 The equivalent variation deﬁned as the lump sum money transfer that would achieve the same change in lifetime utility
as the policy reform. So a positive equivalent variation will indicate an efﬁciency over the baseline and vice versa. See
appendix B, equations B.34 to B.36 for the derivation.










1907 1927 1947 1967 1987 2007 2027 2047 2067 2087 2107 2127 2147










the greatest utility loss since the households in that cohort turned 65 in 2006 and therefore retire
the same year as the policy reform. As a result, they have the misfortune to be leaving the
workforce the same year that the tax on labour income is reduced and the tax on pension income
is increased. Older cohorts have shorter remaining expected lifespans and therefore require less
compensation for the policy change. Younger cohorts beneﬁt from a tax decrease every year
until they retire and also have the opportunity to readjust their savings behaviour in expectation
of lower pension income after retirement. The cohorts born in 1971 and after experience a net
utility gain from the tax reform.
The switch to a tax solely on labour income has the opposite effect on per-cohort utility,
although the welfare redistribution is less extreme. Presently retired and middle-aged cohorts
experience a utility gain while working age cohorts born after 1970 experience a utility loss.
Those cohorts that have yet to enter the workforce (born in 1987 and later) also experience a
utility loss from the tax reform. As we saw above, the tax on labour income is inefﬁcient relative
to the tax on total income due to its smaller base and lack of non-distortionary components. As a
result, future generations are subject to a higher aggregate tax burden.46
The consumption tax reform entails the smallest welfare redistribution of all the reforms.
Since all income is eventually used up in consumption, switching from a tax on total income to a
tax on consumption involves no change in the size of the base in the long run, only in the timing
of the tax payment. The utility loss experienced by presently retired and middle-aged cohorts
46 In the cases of the consumption tax and labour income tax, the welfare redistribution exhibits a similar pattern to that
shown in Figure 5.4 of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
66from the reform is due the fact that they will fund their consumption during retirement in part
with existing ﬁnancial wealth that was already taxed when it was earned as income. This double
taxation will reduce the aggregate tax burden on following generations and as a result, they will
experience a welfare gain from the reform. The ‘break-even’ cohort was born in 1975.
Figure 5.2 also shows the net effects on social welfare of the tax reforms. Not surprisingly,
the switch to the labour income tax is the only scenario that entails an overall welfare loss. The
reasons behind this should be clear from the discussion above. Both the tax on consumption and
on pension income result in welfare gains. The pension income tax scenario is the more
beneﬁcial of the two because of its relatively large lump-sum component.
5.2.3 Delayed reforms
This section explores the intergenerational redistribution caused by postponing the tax reforms
required to enforce ﬁscal sustainability for some time. In the simulations presented in this
section, the rates for the labour income and consumption taxes, respectively, are raised from
their present (i.e. unsustainable) level in particular years and smoothed over time in order to put
government ﬁnances on a sustainable path. A later starting year of tax smoothing results in a
larger debt in percentage of GDP at that date. A larger debt level in turn increases debt services
which can only be raised through a larger future decrease of the primary deﬁcit. Since the
primary deﬁcit must be covered by the tax increase, this implies that the later the sustainability
policy starts, the larger the necessary tax rate change. Table 5.7 illustrates for both the
consumption tax and the labour income tax.
Table 5.7 Required tax rate increase according to the starting year (percentage points)
2006 2026 2046
Consumption tax rate
Anticipated D 4.7 6.7 8.6
Unanticipated D 4.7 6.8 8.8
Labour income tax rate
Anticipated D 7.9 10.1 13.0
Unanticipated D 7.9 10.2 13.2
Table 5.7 also reveals that anticipating behaviour is favourable for the government budget. In
order to smooth consumption over their lifecycles, households decrease their consumption in the
period before the tax rate increases, but do not change their labour supply in this period (See
Figure 5.3 in the case of the consumption tax increase). The boost in private saving increases
ﬁnancial wealth in the year that the policy reform takes place. Thus the total tax base (including
that of asset taxes) increases because households anticipate the future tax rate increase. This
explains why the tax rate increase can be slightly smaller if the policy adjustments are
anticipated.
67The left hand side of Figure 5.3 presents the development of private consumption relative to the
baseline scenario according to the starting year of the consumption tax increase. For
comparison, the effect of tax increases starting in 2006, 2026 and 2046 are shown for scenarios
both when the policies are pre-announced by the government in 2006 and when the policy
change is unexpected up until the year of implementation.
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In the two unexpected scenarios, there are sudden and extreme reductions in consumption in the
years when the policy changes takes place. Since the required tax increase in 2046 is higher than
that in 2026, the decrease in consumption is also greater. When the future policy changes are
known to individuals, the change in consumption behaviour is more gradual, as households
accumulate more savings in anticipation of higher taxes in the future. The ﬁgure reveals that,
despite the fact that pre-announcing is favourable relative to an unexpected policy measure, it
does not fully compensate for the damage of postponing the tax increase.
The right hand side of Figure 5.3 presents the labour supply development under various
consumption tax rate change scenarios and conveys a similar message as the consumption
development. Moreover, it illustrates a characteristic of the model. There is no wealth effect on
labour supply. Thus there is very little difference in labour supply movements between the
expected and unexpected policy changes. In the case of an immediate tax increase (in 2006), the
effect on labour supply is small and remains at a relatively constant level compared to the base
case scenario.
The left hand side of Figure 5.4 presents the absolute change of the primary deﬁcit as a
percentage of GDP according to the starting year of the consumption tax increase. The ﬁgure
illustrates an upwards spike in the primary deﬁcit in the expected tax increase scenarios
immediately before the policy measure becomes effective. This increase is linked to the decrease
in labour supply. The year before the policy measure, investments decline sharply to make the
capital stock consistent with the lower labour supply. This leads to a once-only decline in the
indirect tax receipts on investments.
The development of the absolute level of the government debt to GDP ratio is shown in the
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right hand side of Figure 5.4. It can be seen that postponing the necessary measure increases the
long-run level of the ratio. In all cases the debt to GDP ratio is stabilized in the long run.
However, only the immediate consumption tax increase reduces the debt to around zero. Fiscal
sustainability requires that at any given date, the government’s liabilities must be less than or
equal to the present value of its future revenues. In each of the delayed tax increase scenarios,
taxes are higher than in the immediate tax increase scenario and therefore so are the discounted
future revenues summed indeﬁnitely into the future. Thus the level of the government’s debt
relative to GDP can be higher. The longer the delay in implementation, the higher the required
tax rate increase, the level of government debt and the associated debt service requirements.
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Figure 5.5 presents the welfare consequences of delaying the tax reforms for individuals by year
of birth. These equivalent variation calculations are made relative to an immediate tax reform. In
all cases, the cohort that suffers the most is that which is entering the workforce at the time the
reform comes into effect. For example the cohort that was born in 2006 bears the highest loss if
the reform is introduced in 2026.
In both the labour income and consumption tax cases, the longer the policy reform is
69delayed, the greater the welfare redistribution. This stands to reason because a longer delay
implies that a higher tax rate increase is required (see Table 5.7). So the generation that
experiences the effects of the reform over the greatest part of their working lives will suffer a
larger welfare loss. Conversely a delay means that presently alive generations enjoy a larger
welfare gain because the most escape the tax increase. On balance the aggregate welfare losses
become more severe the more the reform is delayed.
It can be seen from the ﬁgure that a delay in the consumption tax reform entails a much
larger aggregate welfare loss than a delay in the labour income tax reform. This result arises
from the relative efﬁciency of introducing an immediate consumption tax increase rather than a
labour income increase. The immediate introduction of a tax reform is unanticipated by
households so the consumption tax increase can tax the existing ﬁnancial wealth of households.
A delay, by assumption, is preannounced. So presently living households have an incentive to
save less (consume more now) and the future base of the consumption tax is eroded.
5.2.4 Public debt ratio smoothing
Postponement of policy reforms obviously beneﬁts currently alive generations. However, the
postponement scenarios feature highly discontinuous tax rate proﬁles. One way to avoid these
discontinuities is to pursue a more gradual policy of keeping the public debt to GDP ratio at its
initial level every year by adjusting tax rates accordingly. This is similar, although not the same
as a balanced-budget policy in that accounting for the growth of the economy allows the
government to run positive primary deﬁcits. Like a tax smoothing policy, a public debt
smoothing policy meets the requirement of ﬁscal sustainability. Indeed, policies are ﬁscally
sustainable if they stabilize the long-run public debt to GDP ratio.
Here we present the results of two public debt smoothing simulations (for the consumption and
labour income taxes) relative to tax smoothing simulations. Since the government stabilizes the
debt to GDP ratio year-to-year at 2006 level, it is possible to postpone the necessary tax increase,
which means a lower initial tax rate increase relative to the tax smoothing scenario (Figure 5.6).
The tax rate development will then follow the dependency ratio, which is the main determinant
of the debt ratio development. After about 25 years, tax rates become slightly higher than the tax
smoothing rate. The fast increase of the tax rate in the ﬁrst few decades slows down in line with
the development of the dependency ratio. Following 60 years, both debt ratio smoothing tax
rates remain at roughly constant (higher) levels relative to the tax smoothing rates. The
difference is greatest in the case of the debt ratio smoothing with the labour income tax, again
due to its smaller tax base compared to the consumption tax.
Figure 5.7 shows how this tax pattern is reﬂected in the private consumption and labour supply
developments. Since taxes are initially relatively lower, consumption and labour supply are
larger than in the tax smoothing scenario in the beginning of the simulation period. In the
consumption tax case, private consumption becomes permanently lower by 2037, while in the
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Figure 5.7 Public debt ratio smoothing relative to tax smoothing; left: percentage change of private consump-
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labour income tax case, consumption becomes lower about 20 years later. The long run effects
on labour supply of the debt ratio smoothing policies are less severe, although there still is a
decrease relative to the tax smoothing case after about 25 years. In the long run, the relative
differences stabilize and the public debt ratio smoothing policy using the labour income tax has
the most adverse effect on consumption and labour supply because of its higher tax burden.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the welfare effects for individuals by year of birth for each of the public
debt ratio smoothing policies relative to the tax smoothing case. Comparing the two instruments,
it can be seen that the utility gain from pursuing a gradual policy is distributed more widely
among presently living cohorts in the case of the consumption tax. Presently retired cohorts are
indifferent between a tax smoothing policy and a debt ratio smoothing policy using the labour
income tax since they have no labour income. So in that case, all the welfare gains from the debt
71ratio smoothing policy are enjoyed by those cohorts of working age (and slightly younger) in
2006. For both tax instruments, future cohorts suffer from a gradual policy in approximately
equal measures compared to tax smoothing.
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While the switch from tax smoothing to a public debt ratio smoothing policy in the consumption
tax case entails an aggregated welfare loss valued at over 20 billion euros, in the labour income
tax case debt ratio smoothing is welfare improving. At ﬁrst glance this result is puzzling since
the economic efﬁciency of tax smoothing is well established in the theoretical literature (see
Barro (1979) and Kingston (1991)). However, keeping tax rates constant over time in GAMMA
is not equivalent to tax smoothing as conceptualized by theoretical models. These models rely
on the assumption of a direct relationship between tax rates and marginal distortions from
taxation. In the case of labour income tax rates, tax smoothing in GAMMA (as well as in a
real-world economy) does not necessarily imply constant marginal distortions due to a number
of factors. These include a shift in the aggregate labour supply elasticity attributable to
population ageing as well the decline of early retirement and catching up pension premiums in
the coming years. Taking these factors into consideration implies that marginal distortion
smoothing requires increasing labour income tax rates over time.
725.3 Pension reforms
5.3.1 A smaller pension scheme
In this section we investigate the effects on household behaviour, the macroeconomy and
government ﬁnances of a reform that reduces the generosity of the second pillar pension system.
The current tax regime for second pillar pension saving in the Netherlands is an
"exempt-exempt-tax" (EET) scheme: pension contributions are subject to tax relief at the
individual’s then marginal rate (Exempt); investment returns are tax free (Exempt); and pension
income is taxed when received at the individual’s then marginal rate. Other private savings are
made from taxed income (T), investment returns are rolled up ‘after-tax’ (T), and any money
withdrawn from the saving account is exempt from tax (E). This results in a TTE regime. In this
section, we investigate to what extent diminished pension savings are offset by private savings,
i.e. what is the inﬂuence of the tax regime on savings? To answer this question, the accrual rate
on supplementary pensions is decreased by ten percent starting from the year 2010.
Table 5.8 Economic and ﬁscal effects of a smaller pension system
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
Price of leisure (%) − 1.1 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.4 − 0.4
Tax wedge (D) 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Average pension premium (D) − 0.9 − 1.6 − 1.6 − 1.5 − 1.4
Leisure demand (%) 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Employment level (%) − 0.2 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1
Household savings (% GDP) (D) 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4
Pension fund savings (% GDP) (D) − 0.3 − 0.9 − 0.7 − 0.6 − 0.5
Private consumption (% GDP) (D) − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.2
Corporate investment (% GDP) (D) − 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
National consumption (% GDP) (D) − 0.4 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Production (GDP in market prices) (%) − 0.2 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Primary government expenditures (% GDP) (D) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Government revenues (% GDP) (D) 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Sustainability gap (D) − 0.1
Table 5.8 shows the economic and ﬁscal effects of the policy reform. Directly, there is a
permanent decrease in the price of leisure. An uncompensated reduction in expected future
retirement beneﬁts results in a smaller marginal beneﬁt from supplying labour. As a result,
employment declines as does GDP. In addition, household goods consumption at the cohort level
declines for three reasons. First, households are forced to save more for retirement in order to
smooth consumption over their life-cycles. Second, because of the positive relationship between
consumption and labour supply, goods consumption declines in step with the increase in leisure.
73Third, household wealth, out of which consumption is ﬁnanced, is diminished by the decline in
both labour and pension income. At the aggregate level, private savings increase permanently as
a percentage of GDP. It can be seen from the table that the increase in private savings almost
(although not entirely) mirrors the decrease in pension fund savings. This illustrates the
substitutability of private savings for pension wealth.
As illustrated in the table, there is little signiﬁcant inﬂuence from the reform on public
expenditures. Government revenues increase slightly due to the transition from EET taxed
savings to TTE taxed savings. The EET regime is more generous because the labour income tax
rate is larger than the pension income tax rate and due to the tax exemption of wealth increases.
So the reform has a beneﬁcial effect on public ﬁnances. However, the effect is relatively small:
the necessary adjustment to restore sustainability is decreased by only .1% of GDP.
5.3.2 Increasing the retirement age
Increased - and still increasing - life expectancy has already prompted a number of countries to
take pension reform measures, including an increase in retirement age. Here we introduce a
variant to chart the effects of an increase in the statutory retirement age. This scenario assumes
that the age at which peoples’ entitlement to a public pension and supplementary pension
commences is raised in two steps, by a total of two years, to the age of 67. These calculations
assume a one-year step-up of the retirement age in both 2015 and 2025.47 Table 5.9 reveals a
Table 5.9 Population effects of raising the statutory retirement age
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
Percentage of retirees in the population (D) 0 − 1.2 − 2.1 − 2.3 − 2.3
Elderly dependency ratio (D) 0 − 2.8 − 5.5 − 5.4 − 5.6
decline of the old age dependency ratio by 5.5 percentage points in 2040. However, the labour
participation effects will likely be not as large. The computations assume that the productivity
for the group aged 65 years (and 66 years, respectively) is the same as that for the group aged 64.
This implies no wage differentials and the same leisure demands. So, the rate of labour
participation after the increase in retirement age for the group aged 65 years (and 66 years,
respectively) is the same as that for the group aged 64. On that assumption, the effects of the
higher retirement age on effective labour supply in the alternative projection are limited, since
the rate of participation for the 64-year-old group is rather low in the baseline projection. The
baseline projection assumes a participation rate for this group of 10% and 11%, respectively, for
2014 and 2024. While this represents a slight increase in participation (as compared to the
47 If a greater number of steps are assumed for bringing the retirement age up from 65 to 67, as is the case in the United
States and Germany, the effects to be expected are rougly comparable.
74present level of 8%), it is low compared to the labour market participation of the average
cohort.48
Table 5.10 Economic and ﬁscal effects of raising the statutory retirement age
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
Price of leisure (%) − 0.6 − 0.1 − 0.3 − 0.4 − 0.5
Tax wedge (D) 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4
Average pension premium (D) − 0.9 − 2.4 − 2.4 − 2.3 − 2.1
Leisure demand (%) 0.1 − 0.6 − 1.0 − 0.9 − 0.9
Employment level (%) 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Household savings (% GDP) (D) 0.7 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.5
Pension fund savings (% GDP) (D) − 0.4 − 1.1 − 0.9 − 0.7 − 0.6
Private consumption (% GDP) (D) − 0.4 − 0.5 − 0.6 − 0.6 − 0.6
Corporate investment (% GDP) (D) 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government consumption (% GDP) (D) 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
National consumption (% GDP) (D) − 0.2 − 0.5 − 0.7 − 0.7 − 0.7
Production (GDP in market prices) (%) − 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5
Primary government expenditures (% GDP) (D) 0.1 − 0.3 − 0.6 − 0.6 − 0.6
Government revenues (% GDP) (D) 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Sustainability gap (D) − 0.6
The increase of the retirement age makes pensions less generous and indirectly reduces the
subsidy implicit in second-pillar pension schemes. This decreases the leisure price which in turn
reduces labour supply for all age groups, except those between 65 and 67 years of age. At the
aggregate level, employment increases as does GDP.
The increase in the retirement age means that the sustainability gap declines. Table 5.10
shows that it is 0.6%-points smaller than in the baseline projection. Fewer measures are now
required for realising sustainable public ﬁnances since the higher retirement age results in a
smaller increase in spending on public pensions in the coming decades, coupled with higher
government revenues as employment and output are boosted. The increase in employment in this
variant is smaller than the increase in the labour supply of the group aged 65 and over, since the
higher retirement age results in a greater wedge.
Table 5.10 reveals that even though employment and GDP increases household consumption
declines both relative to GDP and in absolute terms. The reason for this decline is the greater
wedge: the tax facilitated savings diminish. Households then have less lifetime wealth from
which to consume goods.
48 The employment effects are a little bit lower than those of Van Ewijk et al. (2006). The latter publication gives an
autonomous impulse on the labour market participation change. In the present study we calculate welfare effects which
needs a utility consist approach. This explans why the outcomes are slightly different.
755.3.3 Welfare effects of pension reforms
Figure 5.9 illustrates the welfare consequences over age groups of the two pension reforms
described above. We have adjusted the labour income tax rate to sustain the government budget
in order to account for the ﬁscal effects of the reforms. In this way, the simulations whose results
are presented here are different from those presented in the previous two sub-sections.
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In the case of the switch to a smaller pension system, it can be seen that there is little welfare
impact from the reform. Presently working and future cohorts experience both a reduction in
future pension beneﬁts and an increase in net (after-tax) wages. Those cohorts who are closer to
retirement at the time of the reform suffer a net welfare loss. However, all other cohorts enjoy a
welfare gain due to the fact that the beneﬁt from reducing the relatively distortionary labour
income tax outweighs the loss from decreasing the generosity of the pension system. Aggregated
across all cohorts, the welfare effects of the reform are negative, although insigniﬁcant.
The reform that increases the retirment age has more extreme distributional effects. The two
downward spikes in the ﬁgure correspond to the cohorts born in the years 1950 and 1959.
Respectively, those households will turn 65 and 66 in the years 2015 and 2025, when the policy
reforms come into place. As a result, those cohorts must work one more year than they would
have otherwise before being able to receive pension beneﬁts and, so, suffer a welfare loss. The
reform is beneﬁcial for government ﬁnances, however, and this enables a reduction in the labour
income tax rate. As a result, future cohorts enjoy a welfare gain. It can be seen that presently
retired cohorts also beneﬁt from the policy reform. Since increasing the retirment age improves
the ﬁnancial position of private pension funds, beneﬁts can increase due to greater indexation.
766 Final remarks
In chapters 4 and 5 it was shown how GAMMA can effectively be used to conduct long-term
policy analysis. In addition to making projections about future economic and ﬁscal
developments, the model is able to simulate convincing alternative scenarios that are highly
relevant for policy makers. These scenarios may take the form of sensitivity analyses, such as
changes to the input data or parameters of the model or the form of policy simulations which
allow an evaluation of various reform options.
Two major publications of the CPB (Westerhout et al. (2004) and Van Ewijk et al. (2006))
have used GAMMA to demonstrate the consequences of population ageing on the sustainability
of public ﬁnances and the private pension system in The Netherlands. Over time the model has
been extended to allow it to be used for a wider range of purposes. Reﬁnements made to the
household block have enabled the production of more plausible feedback reactions in the
simulations. In addition, the introduction of equivalent variations enabled consistent welfare
analyses. This innovation is helpful in two respects. First, the equivalent variations of different
cohorts from a policy simulation may be compared to assess the degree of intergenerational
redistribution entailed by the reform. Second, aggregating equivalent variations over all cohorts
is akin to creating a social welfare function since it indicates whether Pareto improvement is
possible. While the GAMMA model will continue to be used to assess the sustainability of
public ﬁnances and pensions, it will also be used increasingly to study the intergenerational
consequences of speciﬁc reform measures. Examples of such measures are the introduction of
life-cycle savings accounts, adjustments to the tax structure and alternative debt policy
arrangements.
The GAMMA model is in a continual process of development. As with any economic model
it relies on simplifying assumptions and, as such, suffers from a number of shortcomings that
will be addressed in the future:
• A complete set of perfect markets exists. The neglect of capital constraints on households
constitutes an important abstraction from reality that may have a bearing on the model’s
predictive power.
• There is one global market price for goods and capital. In doing so, there is no accomodation for
terms-of-trade effects. The question whether such effects persist in the long run still has to be
investigated.
• The risk premium applied to the return on equity is modelled in a rudimentary way. Portfolio
shares are imposed exogenously so there is no correspondence between the premium and the risk
aversion of households.
• Production occurs with only labour and capital as inputs. The inﬂuence of infrastructure and
human capital on national income should otherwise be included in policy assessments.
77• The form of the social welfare function does not account for changes in government
consumption due to policy reforms. As a result, only welfare analyses of reforms to public
revenue arrangements are possible.
• Agents face no uncertainty at the cohort level. This assumption has important implications for
the behavioural underpinnings of the model.
GAMMA will continue to be improved in these aspects in the future.
78Appendix A The circular ﬂow
Table A.1 presents the total accounts of the Dutch economy as a circular ﬂow, describing the
macro-economic relations identiﬁed in the GAMMA model. The row entries of the total
accounts are markets, or subdivisions of a market into transactions and the column entries are
agents. The aggregated market transactions over agents (row total) sum to zero. The table
distinguishes between markets for goods, capital and labour in addition to accounting for income
transfers from the government to households. The capital market is subdivided into investment
activities, income from capital and proﬁt taxes. GAMMA identiﬁes the following agents:
households, pension funds, the government, ﬁrms and the foreign sector. Capital is included as
an artiﬁcial agent, distinguished to make total investments and investments of the different
sectors explicit. The model subdivides the household sector into one hundred age cohorts,
however the table presents only the aggregated household sector. The government sector is
subdivided into expenditures, income and production. A cell in the table gives the transactions of
agents on a market (+ receipt, − payment). The aggregated budget constraint of agents is
obtained by adding up over the column: the sum of revenues minus expenditures equals savings.
That is, the column totals are zero.
Table A.1 Total accounts: circular ﬂows
House- Pension Capital Government Firms Foreign å
holds funds Expenditures Income Production sector
Goods −Ch −I −Cg Tin Ygg Yge −Ex 0
Investments I −Ig −Ie 0
Income transfers Yt −Yt 0
Labour income Ywh −Ywg −Ywe 0
Private pensions Bp −Bp 0
Non-labour income Yzh Yzp −Xr Yzg −Yze Yzf 0
Income taxes −Ty Ty 0
Proﬁt tax Tp −Tp 0
Private pension premiums −Pp Pp 0
Transfers to foreigners −Xfo Xfo 0
Savings(-)/shortage(+) −Svh −Svp Svg Wbe −Svf 0
å 0 0 0 0 0 0
There is one good in GAMMA used for consumption, investment and exports. Imported goods
are perfectly substitutable with domestic goods. The difference between domestically produced
goods (by the governmentYgg and by ﬁrmsYge) and the domestic demand (private consumption
Ch plus investments I plus government consumptionCg) minus indirect taxes plus subsidies Tin
is sold abroad Ex. Households ﬁnance their consumption and pay tax and pension premiums (Ch,
Ty and Pp respectively) with income from labour, transfers, pensions and asset wealth (Ywh,Yt, Bp
andYzh respectively). In addition, they save privately for retirement Svh.
79Pension funds ﬁnance their payments Bp out of premium receipts Pp and income from wealth
Yzp. Wealth of pension funds grows with their savings Svp. Government expenditures consist of
government consumptionCg (defence, schooling, health care and public administration), income
transfersYt (social assistance, children’s assistance, public old-age-, disability-, unemployment-
beneﬁts and other social transfers), transfers to foreigners Xfo and debt services Xr. The
government levies indirect taxes Tin (exclusive of subsidies), income taxes Ty, proﬁt taxes Tp and
other income taxesYzg (presented as non-labour income). The government produces servicesYgg
using labourYwg and capital which is created with public investments Ig. The EMU deﬁcit of the
government is Svg. Firms also produceYge with labourYwe and capital. Private capital formation
takes place through investments Ie. The capital costs of ﬁrms consist of depreciation, proﬁt taxes
Tp and ﬁnance costsYze.49 The difference between income and expenditures of ﬁrms are the
savings of ﬁrmsWbe, which is the change of the stock of bonds issued by ﬁrms.
Table A.2 The total accounts: changes in total assets
Households Pension Government Firms Foreign å
sector sector
Savings Svh Svp −Svg −Wbe Svf 0
Asset changes by emigration −Weh −Wep Wef 0
Asset changes by immigration Wih Wip −Wif 0
Revaluation of assets Wrh Wrp Wrg −Wre Wrf 0
Change of ﬁnancial wealth −Wfh Wfp Wfg Wfe −Wff 0
å 0 0 0 0 0 0
The savings of agents is one of three determinants of the aggregated total asset change (Wfh,Wfp,
Wfg,Wfe,Wff for households, pension funds, government, ﬁrms and the foreign sector
respectively). The other two determinants are net migration and revaluation of assets as Table
A.2 reveals.50 GAMMA assumes that migrants are representative agents: they have the same
assets as natives of the same age. Migrants import (Wih) or export (Weh) those assets. Moreover,
immigrants buy into the pension system (Wip) with a purchase price equal to the value of pension
rights while emigrants leave the pension system taking with them a money amount (Wep) equal
to the value of pension rights. Revaluation of bonds is not modelled: GAMMA implicitly
assumes a one-year duration of bonds. That is why the revaluation of assets (Wrh,Wrp,Wrg,Wrf
for households, pension funds, government and the foreign sector respectively) concerns the
revaluation of shares only. The aggregate of these revaluations equals the change of the value of
the ﬁrm (Wre).
49 Yze consists of dividend payments, interest payments on debt, central bank proﬁts paid to the government and income
from leasing of land plus exogenous production Ygo in the base year (see section 3.4). So:
Yze = Div +rbWs
be(t −1)+Gcb +Gpg +Ygo.
50 Note, the government sector is not split up anymore, while the artiﬁcial capital sector is left out of the table.
80Table A.3 The total accounts: portfolio changes
Households Pension Government Firms Foreign å
sector sector
Change of ﬁnancial wealth Wfh −Wfp −Wvg −Wfe Wff 0
Change of shares −Wsh −Wsp −Wsg Wse −Wsf 0
Change of bonds −Wbh −Wbp Wbg Wbe −Wbf 0
å 0 0 0 0 0
The total asset change is split up into the change of bonds and shares in Table A.3. The asset
changes and investments determine the balances which are presented in Table A.4. The
government has a claimWs
cg on ﬁrms because it owns the central bank and land development
companies. This is not the only reason for a difference between the value of the capital stock of
ﬁrms (Ks
e) evaluated in production prices and the sum of the value of shares (Ws
se) and bonds
(Ws
be). The effective price of capital deviates from the production price of investment goods
through tax facilities (see equation C.23 in appendix C). This appraisal difference is variable
Ws
res. The total capital stock (Ks) valued at current production prices deviates from the total
capital stock evaluated at effective prices (Ws
fc). The total assets of households (Ws
fh), pension
funds (Ws
fp), the government (Ws
ng) and the foreign sector (Ws
ff) equals the total capital stock
evaluated at effective prices.
Table A.4 The total accounts: balances





























å 0 0 0 0 0 0
8182Appendix B Household model
B.1 Financial wealth; The Yaari assumption
The Yaari assumption is an easy way to close the household model. It describes how wealth of
the deceased is distributed over the survivors. Assume homogeneity within an age cohort.
Population size, ns




with ξ(j,t) = (1+qi(j,t)−qe(j,t))(1−qd(j,t)),
qi the immigration rate, qe the emigration rate and qd the death rate. Deﬁne households’ nominal
rate of return, rh, ﬁnancial wealth exclusive of pension rights, Ws
fh, annual after tax income
incomeY, consumption of goodsCh (= chpc), the change in wealth through immigration Wih,
the change in wealth through emigration Weh. The relationship between the development of
















Assume homogeneity of immigrants, emigrants and the non-migrant population. The change in
wealth through emigration and immigration is then proportional to end of period wealth.
Moreover, assume wealth from dying persons devolve upon their age cohort (Yaari assumption).










This micro-economic budget equation is consistent with the macro economic equation (B.2). So,
we assume each individual receives an annuity from a life insurance company in return for
bequeathing it its remaining assets upon death to close the model in an easy way.
In the next section we will describe how this budget equation is related to budget equation
(2.5) in the main text. Because age and time are related on a one to one basis at the micro-level,
the time indicator will be suppressed onwards.
Total wealth
In this appendix we attribute all income related to labour (wage income and pension beneﬁts)
directly to household labour supply. The starting point is the ﬁnancial wealth equation (B.3).
51 After aggregation of the individual variables their relation with the circular ﬂow variables can be stated as: consumption
Ch equals the circular ﬂow variable; rhWs
fh(−1) =Yzh −Tk with Tk wealth taxes; Y =Yt +Ywh −(Ty +Tk)+Bp −Pp
















After tax income can be split up into after tax wage incomeYwn, after tax pension incomeYp and
after tax transfer incomeYtn. After tax pension income can be split up into pension income linked
to labour before the current year Yp1 and pension income linked to current and future labourYp2
Y(j) =Ywn(j)+Yp1(j)+Yp2(j)+Ytn(j) (B.5)
The discounted value of labour income and pension beneﬁts which can be attributed to current
and future labour can be written as the discounted value of the product of labour time with a




















the pension rights which are built up at the end of period j−1. At the end of ones’ life pension
rights will be zero. Total ﬁnancial wealth of households is deﬁned as the sum of ﬁnancial wealth
actually in the hands of the households and pension rightsWs
f (j) =Ws
fh(j)+Ws
ph(j). It is now
easy to show that this can be written as equation (2.5) and (2.6) withYf(j) = pv(j)+Ytn(j). We
will now present details on the precise deﬁnitions of the different income sources.
B.2 Elaborating on the income sources
In this paragraph we will deﬁne after tax wage incomeYwn, after tax pension incomeYp and after
tax transfer incomeYtn. The starting point is total annual after-tax income Y, which is the
difference between non-capital income and taxes. Taxes consist of wage taxes Tl, transfer
income taxes Tsb, taxes on private and public pensions Tr, other income taxes Ter, early
retirement premiums Per, and private pension premiums Pp, but exclude taxes on imputed
income from wealth (included in the after tax rate of return). Labour and transfer income taxes
include public pension premiums.
Income consists of transfersYt, private pensions beneﬁts Bp, wage incomeYwh and early
retirement beneﬁts Ber. Transfer incomeYt includes social assistance Bsa, children’s assistance
Bca, public old-age beneﬁts Bea (ﬁrst pillar), disability Bda , unemployment beneﬁts Bun and
other social transfers Bot
Yt(j) = Bsa(j)+Bca(j)+Bea(j)+Bda(j)+Bun(j)+Bot(j) (B.8)
84Wage income depends on the labour time and the wage rate
Ywh(j) = (1−v(j))pl(j) and j ∈ {jw,..., jr −1} (B.9)
Pension beneﬁts are also a function of labour supply. We will distinguish between three pension
systems: a ﬁnal wage system, an average wage system and a deﬁned contribution system. The
relationship between work and pension beneﬁts is different for these three systems. This will be
elaborated in appendix B.3. Taxes and pension premiums are related to the tax and premium
bases.
Tl(j) = (τli+τgp)[Ywh(j)−Pp(j)−Per(j)] and j ∈ {jw,..., jr −1} (B.10)
Tsb(j) = (τsb+τgp)[Bsa(j)+Bda(j)+Bun(j)] and j ∈ {jw,..., jr −1}
Tr(j) = τr[Bea(j)+Bp(j)] and j ∈ {jr,..., je}
Pp(j) = τppHp(j) and j ∈ {jw,..., jr −1}
Per(j) = τerYwh(j) and j ∈ {jw,..., jr −1}
In these equations τ indicates a tax/premium rate and Hp(j) the pension premium base. We can
now deﬁne after tax wage income Ywn, after tax pension incomeYp and after tax transfer income
Ytn





This implies for the price of leisure










With plg the gross wage of households, fp the pension franchise and ε(j) the fraction of workers
in the second pillar pension system as in equation (2.34) in section 2.6. We will now indicate
howYp2 can be rewritten to get an explicit expression for pv2 (see equation B.12 and B.11). This
second part of the leisure price will depend on the pension system.
B.3 The price of leisure
Final wage system
In the ﬁnal wage system private pensions are proportional to the premium base (plg(j)− fp) at
the beginning of the pension period. The proportionality factor depends on the number of
85participation years and a built up percentage a
f
p. The pension beneﬁts after the ﬁrst pension year
are indexed to prices, productivity and wages. Assume the pension beneﬁts start in the year of







pensions will start later on. Moreover, the beneﬁts will be given several years. This delay and
distribution effect can be represented in a discount value term d
f
pv. One more unit of labour








of net, additional future pension beneﬁts (pv2).
Average wage system
In the average wage system private pensions (Pu) are proportional to pension rights. These
pension rights increase over time for two reasons. First, the old rights are indexed. Second,
through participation the rights increase proportionally to the premium base (plg(j)− fp). The
proportionality factor is aa
p. The pension beneﬁts after the ﬁrst pension year are also indexed.
This implies that we can write the net, additional future pension rights in the same way as in the









pv again represents the delay and distribution effect. The main difference with the ﬁnal
wage system is the difference of the discount factor, since in the ﬁnal wage system old pension
rights increase with the premium base, while in the average wage system they change with the
general indexation factor. The difference is the incidental wage component.
Deﬁned contribution system
In the deﬁned contribution system private pensions Pu are an annuity dependent on wealth built
up in the working ages. Wealth accumulates in the working ages. After the working ages wealth












of net, additional future pension beneﬁts (pv2). In this equation dd
pv again represents the delay
and distribution term while md
p presents the annuity distribution of the premium over the pension
years. The main diffrence with the ﬁnal wage and the average wage system is the link of the
beneﬁts to the premium base.
B.4 The consumption problem
Households maximize the utility function (2.2) as a function of the consumption of goods and
leisure given the budget equation (2.5) and given the restriction that leisure is less than or equal






















First order conditions for an optimum are
Lc(i) = αc(i)1−γ (ch(i)−cl)
−γ ds(i)−λdo(i)pc(i) = 0, (B.17)
Lv(i) = αc(i)1−γ (ch(i)−cl)
−γ ds(i)v(i)−β αv(i)
αc(i)
−λdo(i)e pv(i) = 0, and
e pv(i) = pv(i)+µ(i), (B.18)
µ(i)Lµ(i) = µ(i)[v(i)−1] = 0. (B.19)














, i ≥ jr. (B.21)









pv(i) if v(i) = 1 and i < jr, (B.22)
otherwise:
µ(i) = 0 if v(i) < 1 and i < jr.












Deﬁne xf(i) = αc(i)(c(i)−cl(i)) and px(i) = αc(i)−1pc(i) and substitute the consumption and





































So variable xl decreases with an increase of v. Equivalently an increase of labour supply implies
an increase of xl. The most easy interpretation is an expenditure commitment to compensate for
missing leisure.






















Substitution of the Euler equation (B.29) leads to




















































px(i). In practise this result very rarely arises.





































8990Appendix C Firm model
The budget equation (2.12) in the main text can be written (after substitution of (2.13) and
(2.14)) as
Div(t) = (1−τp)[p(t)yge(t)− ple(t)le(t)]−(1−ρ1)p(t)ig(t)+τpAf(t)−Gnt(t) (C.1)
−[(1−τp)rb+ρ0]Ws
be(t −1) (C.2)
The variable Gnt includes payments to the government other than taxes and dividends.
Gnt(t) = Gcb(t)+(1−τp)Gpg(t) (C.3)








The discounted value of the ﬁscal depreciation can be split up into depreciation on the existing














ie(t + j)p(t + j)(1+rs)
−j +AFt (C.5)







ie(t − j)p(t − j). (C.6)
The value of AF(t) is given and therefore does not affect the optimization problem.
The ﬁrm maximizes its own value (C.4) given the capital accumulation equation (2.17) and










−ρ1)ig(t + j)p(t + j)−Gnt(t + j)−[(1−τp)rb+ρ0]Ws
be(t + j−1)
− q(t + j)[ks
e(t + j)−(1−φ)ks
e(t + j−1)−ie(t + j)]
+ λ(t + j)[Ws
be(t + j)−(1−ρ0)Ws
be(t + j−1)−ρ1p(t + j)ie(t + j)])(1+rs)
−j
+τpAF(t)
with F the production function. First order conditions for an optimum are :
ι. Lle = 0 ; ιι. Lks
e = 0 ; ιιι. Lie = 0 ; ιυ. LWs






































The ﬁrst order condition for the marginal product of capital becomes
(1−τp)p(t +1)Fks





























The marginal product of capital is determined by exogenous variables only. So, we can use the
marginal productivity equation to determine the capital stock. Labour supply is exogenous. The
marginal productivity equation of labour and the production function determine the production






























92Dividing both equations gives the capital equation (2.18) of the main text. Substitution of the


































Dividing both sides by production and bringing the wage to the left side gives the wage equation
(2.21) of the main text. We now derive now a relation between the capital stock and the value of
the ﬁrm. We make use of the homogeneity of the production function. After some substitutions















Forward solution leads to the conclusion that the value of the capital stock minus the value of
debt equals the discounted value of the dividend payments (the value of the ﬁrm) minus the










So for the value of the ﬁrm we have the value of the capital stock valued at effective prices
minus the value of debt plus the value of the depreciation allowance on investments installed up























−j the net present value of non-tax government claims on
ﬁrms.
9394Appendix D Pension model
We distinguish three private pension schemes. The main text described the average wage deﬁned
beneﬁt system, which is representative of most current pension arrangements. This appendix
describes the two other schemes that may be implemented in GAMMA, the ﬁnal wage deﬁned
beneﬁt system and the deﬁned contribution system.
D.1 Final wage scheme
In a ﬁnal wage scheme the level of a pension beneﬁt is determined by the ﬁnal wage and the











plh(j)Hp(j) if j ∈ {jw,..., jr −1}
W
f




p the accrual rate of the ﬁnal wage scheme. Like in the average wage scheme, after
retirement the pension build-up grows with the indexation parameter ψ. The nominal pension
liabilities (Zs















Otherwise the ﬁnal wage scheme is the same as the average wage system.
D.2 Deﬁned Contribution (DC) scheme
Now we turn to a DC arrangement. In its most pure form a DC arrangement is characterized by a
ﬁxed premium rate and a variable pension beneﬁt. At this moment only four percent of the
workers participating in a supplementary pension arrangement have a DC scheme in the
Netherlands.
Pension liabilities
By deﬁnition in a DC scheme the pension liabilities of the pension fund are equal to the assets.
Accordingly, the pension rights of an individual of age j, are equivalent to his accumulated
pension contributions. These pension rights (Wd








j ∈ {jw,..., je} (D.3)
In GAMMA it is imposed that the assets of deceased individuals belonging to generation j is
distributed equally between the survivors of that generation. As a consequence, individuals who
95survive have more assets than they would if nobody passed away. This explains why the
right-hand side of equation (D.3) is divided by the survival probability (ζ).53
Contribution rate and pension beneﬁt
The DC scheme of GAMMA is characterized by a ﬁxed premium rate and a variable pension
beneﬁt. The contribution rate is determined once, namely at the age an individual enters the
labour market (jw), and from then on this individual always pays this contribution rate until the
retirement age (jr). The determination of the contribution rate is based on a target level for the
future pension beneﬁts. This pension target (Prt) is set according to the pension rights build-up of





















if j ∈ {jr−1,.., je−1}
0 if j = e
(D.5)
the present value of a real pension beneﬁt of one euro.
The total contribution base at the time an individual starts working is equal to his stock of
human capital. Human capital (Hs
p) is deﬁned as the present value of the sum of all yearly









p(j+1) if j ∈ {jw,..., jr−1}
0 if j ∈ {jr,.., je}
(D.6)








p(j) if j = jw
τ d
pp(j−1) if j ∈ {jr,..., je}
(D.7)
At the time an individual retires, the pension fund calculates the actual pension beneﬁt as an
indexed annuity. Every year the individual receives this pension beneﬁt (Bd








, j ∈ {jr,..., je} (D.8)
53 For the interested reader, Bonenkamp (2006, forthcoming) provides a derivation of equation (D.3).
96Appendix E Growth characteristics of the GAMMA model
In this appendix we present three simulations that demonstrate the growth characteristics of the
model. The simulations apply shocks to the inﬂation rate, the productivity growth rate and the
population growth rate. We investigate the homogeneity of the model by showing how these rate
changes affect the model outcomes in terms of GDP.
E.1 Inﬂation
Table E.1 shows the effects of an increase in the inﬂation rate by half a percentage point in 2006.
It can be seen that there is no inﬂuence from the shock on public expenditures beyond a small
decrease in debt service payments arising from a net increase in tax revenues.
Table E.1 Fiscal effects of 0.5 percent more inﬂation
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
% GDP
Expenditures
Social security (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Health care (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Education (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other expenditures exclusive debt services (D) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Debt services (D) 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 0.0 0.0
Total (D) 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 0.0 0.0
Revenues
Income taxes and social premiums (D) 0.2 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
- on pension income (D) 0.0 0.0 − 0.1 0.0 0.0
Indirect taxes (D) − 0.4 − 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
- on consumption by 65+ (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Proﬁt taxes (D) − 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other income (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total (D) − 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sustainability gap (D) − 0.1
Primary EMU balance (D) − 0.4 0.0 − 0.1 0.0 0.0
EMU balance (D) − 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
EMU-debt (D) − 0.9 − 3.1 − 0.5 1.1 1.8
The small changes in government revenues as percentages of GDP follow two opposing paths.
The long run developments in labour income and pension income taxation are explained by the
inﬂuence of inﬂation on the user cost of capital.54 Inﬂation affects the user cost of capital
54 Deﬁned in equation 2.19 in section 2.4.2.
97through the historical cost price depreciation allowance as well as the structure of debt service
deductability. An increase in the inﬂation rate increases the user cost of capital which, in the
long-run, will decrease private sector investment and the capital stock. As a result, real wages
decline and so there is a negative effect on wage and pension income tax receipts. This result
also explains the negative development of consumption tax receipts due to the positive
correlation between consumption and labour income. The movement in proﬁt tax revenue is also
explained by the changes in the ﬁscal depreciation allowance. The real value of private sector
proﬁts falls due to the increase in the user cost of capital. However, since the depreciation
allowance is based on the price of capital at the time it is purchased, the deduction decreases at a
faster rate than proﬁts and the base for corporate taxation grows. The net effect of the changes in
government revenue is negligible: the required adjustment decreases by .1% point of GDP as a
result of the shock.
Table E.2 Macroeconomic effects of 0.5 percent more inﬂation
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
% GDP
Expenditures
Wage income (D) − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Net other income (D) 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Depreciation (D) 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Indirect taxes less subsidies (D) − 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gross domestic product (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Components of national consumption
Private consumption (D) − 0.2 − 0.2 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Government consumption (D) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Corporate investment (D) − 3.2 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Government investment (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
National consumption (D) − 3.3 − 0.2 − 0.2 − 0.2 − 0.2
Balance of current foreign transactions (D) 3.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Net foreign assets a (D) 1.8 5.5 6.5 6.8 7.2
Gross national product b (D) − 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
(level)
Production (GDP) (%) − 0.6 − 0.5 − 0.5 − 0.5 − 0.5
Employment (%) − 0.2 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
a Value at the end of the year
b GDP plus balance of primary revenues from abroad
In the short run the temporary increase in revenue from wage taxes is notable. The wage decline
leads to lower pension fund liabilities and, therefore, lower premiums. On balance the wage tax
base increases temporarily.
These effects are also apparent in the development of macroeconomic variables. Table E.2
98shows a change in the composition of GDP. The decline in the absolute levels of wage income
and depreciation arising from lower capital stock levels is compensated by the residual category
‘net other income’. Indeed, net other income increases on balance of the user cost of capital
increase and the capital stock decline due to a subsitution elasticity between capital and labour
lower than one The combined effects of lower household consumption and corporate investment
due to lower wages and a higher user cost of capital result in a decrease in national consumption
and, hence, an increase in the balance of trade surplus.
E.2 Productivity growth
The second variant in Table E.3 shows the effects of growth in labour productivity pegged at
0.5% points higher than in the baseline projection. The structural growth of labour productivity
will not affect labour supply because the utility parameters will adjust in line with the increase.55
This variant pushes up the extent of the corrective budgetary measures required in 2006 by about
Table E.3 Fiscal effects of a 0.5 percent larger productivity growth
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
% GDP
Expenditures
Social security (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Health care (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Education (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other expenditures exclusive debt services (D) − 1.1 − 1.0 − 0.9 − 0.9 − 0.9
Debt services (D) 0.0 − 0.6 − 0.5 − 0.3 − 0.2
Total (D) − 1.2 − 1.5 − 1.3 − 1.2 − 1.0
Revenues
Income taxes and social premiums (D) − 0.1 − 0.3 − 0.6 − 0.6 − 0.5
- on pension income (D) 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.1 − 0.1
Indirect taxes (D) 0.6 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
- on consumption by 65+ (D) 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3
Proﬁt taxes (D) 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Other income (D) 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Total (D) 0.4 − 0.5 − 0.9 − 0.9 − 0.8
Sustainability gap (D) 1.0
Primary EMU balance (D) 1.6 0.5 − 0.1 − 0.1 0.0
EMU balance (D) 1.6 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.1
EMU-debt (D) − 2.1 − 15.6 − 14.5 − 9.6 − 4.7
1% of GDP. It can be seen that there is no long-run inﬂuence from the shock on the relative
development of public expenditures beyond an increase in debt service payments arising from a
55 Note 15 details on this assumption.
99net decrease in tax revenues. Indeed, all government expenditures rise with productivity and so
will stay in constant proportion to GDP. However, several revenue sources lag behind GDP
development, in particular income taxes.
Within income taxes, the tax on income from ﬁnancial wealth explains about half of the
decrease. Financial wealth declines relatively because, without liquidity constraints,
consumption takes place out of total wealth, the sum of ﬁnancial wealth and human wealth. A
rise of human wealth due to increased productivity growth leads to more consumption when
households are young and so as a result, there is a relative decline in ﬁnancial wealth. The labour
income tax in percentages of GDP also declines. The labour income tax deductibility of the
pension premiums is the origin of this development. The pension premium rate has to rise
because second pillar pensions are funded. In case of a permanent productivity growth rise,
future pensions rise more than the wages out of which the pensions have to be ﬁnanced. This
pension premium rise would not occur in a pay-as-you-go pension system but is characteristic
for a funded pension system.
Table E.4 Macroeconomic effects of a 0.5 percent larger productivity growth
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
% GDP
Expenditures
Wage income (D) − 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Net other income (D) − 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Depreciation (D) − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Indirect taxes less subsidies (D) 0.5 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Gross domestic product (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Components of national consumption
Private consumption (D) 0.6 − 0.4 − 1.1 − 1.1 − 1.1
Government consumption (D) − 1.1 − 1.0 − 0.9 − 0.9 − 0.9
Corporate investment (D) 3.4 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8
Government investment (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
National consumption (D) 2.9 0.4 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Balance of current foreign transactions (D) − 2.8 − 0.6 − 0.1 0.0 0.1
Net foreign assets a (D) − 1.1 − 9.6 − 14.3 − 11.8 − 8.7
Gross national product b (D) 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.2 − 0.1
(level)
Production (GDP) (%) 0.9 7.6 18.4 30.6 58.8
Employment (%) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 − 0.1
a Value at the end of the year
b GDP plus balance of primary revenues from abroad
The other revenues stay more in line with the development of GDP. The indirect tax and proﬁt
tax decreases are rather small. However, in the case of indirect taxes this is the result of two
100counterbalancing effects: indirect taxes on investment increase, while indirect taxes on
consumption decrease. More precisely, indirect taxes on consumption decrease relative to GDP
in the long run, which is relevant for the sustainability, but rise in the short run. This is caused by
consumption smoothing which leads to frontloading: households anticipate future income rises
by increasing their consumption earlier. The investment tax rise and proﬁt tax decline are caused
by an investment ratio rise. Note that the tax base for the proﬁt tax is proﬁts net of depreciation
allowances and net of debt service payments, both of which are linked to new investments.
Table E.4 shows the macroeconomic effects of a 0.5% point higher productivity growth.
With regard to the long-run, the larger investment ratio is notable. Higher labour augmenting
technological progress encourages investment. Indeed, the investment ratio is proportional to the
growth rate plus the depreciation rate. The development of the consumption ratio is explained
above.
So the labour productivity increases have a negative impact on sustainability, due to the life
cycle behaviour of agents and due to the funded second pillar pension system.
E.3 Population growth
The third variant in Table E.5 shows the effects of a 0.5 percentage point higher population
growth. The population growth is established by net migration such that the dependency ratio is
not affected.
This variant pushes up the extent of the measures required in 2006 by about 0.3% of GDP. It
can be seen that there is no long-run inﬂuence from the shock on the relative development of
public expenditures beyond an increase in debt service arising from a net decrease in tax
revenues. Indeed, all government expenditures rise with the population growth and stay in
constant proportion to GDP.
A larger population implies more employment, which induces more investments which increase
indirect tax revenues. However, this favourable development for government ﬁnances is
counterbalanced by the proﬁt tax development. The tax base for proﬁt taxes in percentage of
GDP shrinks through the ﬁscal depreciation allowance and the deductibility of the increased
debt, which is used to ﬁnance investments. The labour income tax in percentage of GDP also
declines. The labour income tax deductibility of the pension premiums is the origin of this
development. Pension premiums increase because migrants buy into the pension fund according
to the nominal pension rights while they receive real pension rights. This leads to a decline in the
coverage rate and thus to larger pension premiums.
Table E.6 shows the main macro economic effects: a relative increase of the investments and
a relative decrease of consumption. More growth means relative more investments.
Consumption declines relative to GDP due to the larger pension premiums.
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2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
% GDP
Expenditures
Social security (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Health care (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Education (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other expenditures exclusive debt services (D) − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3
Debt services (D) 0.0 − 0.3 − 0.2 − 0.2 − 0.1
Total (D) − 0.2 − 0.6 − 0.5 − 0.5 − 0.4
Revenues
Income taxes and social premiums (D) 0.0 0.0 − 0.2 − 0.1 − 0.1
- on pension income (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Indirect taxes (D) − 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
- on consumption by 65+ (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Proﬁt taxes (D) 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Other income (D) 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Total (D) 0.0 0.0 − 0.3 − 0.2 − 0.2
Sustainability gap (D) 0.3
Primary EMU balance (D) 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
EMU balance (D) 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
EMU-debt (D) − 0.2 − 7.5 − 7.1 − 5.6 − 4.2
E.4 Homogeneity of the Model
Figure E.1 illustrates the homogeneity of the GAMMA model. For each of the three simulations
presented above, the difference from the baseline scenario in the stock of net foreign assets as
percentages GDP are plotted.56 Homogeneity requires that the growth in macroeconomic
variables as percentages of GDP stabilize at constant levels in the long run. As the ﬁgure
demonstrates, this condition is satisﬁed. While there are initial deviations in the asset levels with
respect to GDP relative to the baseline, after 2106 the differences stabilize in all three scenarios.
Thus the long-run growth rates are unaffected.
56 Any one of several macroeconomic variables would make this point. We chose ‘net foreign asset holdings’ because its
development is not directly affected by the ﬁscal sustainability mechanism that is applied to the simulations.
102Table E.6 Macroeconomic effects of a 0.5 percent larger population growth
2006 2020 2040 2060 2100
% GDP
Expenditures
Wage income (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net other income (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Depreciation (D) 0.0 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 0.1
Indirect taxes less subsidies (D) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Gross domestic product (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Components of national consumption
Private consumption (D) − 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.2 − 0.2 − 0.2
Government consumption (D) − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3 − 0.3
Corporate investment (D) − 0.1 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8
Government investment (D) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
National consumption (D) − 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3
Balance of current foreign transactions (D) 0.6 − 1.0 − 1.1 − 1.0 − 1.0
Net foreign assets a (D) 1.5 5.0 6.2 7.2 8.4
Gross national product b (D) 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
(level)
Production (GDP) (%) − 0.1 5.2 16.0 28.2 56.5
Employment (%) 0.0 5.1 16.1 28.2 56.5
a Value at the end of the year
b GDP plus balance of primary revenues from abroad












In the text we used upper case letters for values and lower case letters for volumes. We use
sufﬁxes as indicators for variables that refer to speciﬁc time periods or ages. For individual
variables we use only the age sufﬁx j, for intergenerational variables we use both the age sufﬁx j
and the time sufﬁx t, for aggregated (macro) variables we use only time sufﬁx t. At the
individual level time and age are related on a one-to-one basis. So using the age indicator j is
sufﬁcient. Stocks are measured at the end of the period and are indicated with a superscript s.
ai
p pension accrual rate i = a (average wage DB), f (ﬁnal wage DB),d (DC)
Af ﬁscal depreciation allowance
AF value of ﬁscal depreciation on existing capital stock
b total beneﬁts received from the government
bca children’s assistance transfers
bda disability transfers
be public outlays on education
ber early retirment beneﬁts
bgp public pension beneﬁts
bh public outlays on health care
bi age-related beneﬁts from the government
bn net beneﬁts of households from the public sector
bs
n net present value of lifetime household beneﬁts from the public sector
bot transfers other than pensions, disability, unemployment and social assistance
bi
p private pension beneﬁts, i = a, f,d
bsa social assistance
bun public unemployment transfer
ch household goods consumption
cg aggregate public consumption
cl labour induced commodity consumptiond:
div dividends
dn discount factor for net beneﬁts
do objective discount factor household optimaization problem
dp objective discount factor on pension liabilities
di
pv discount factor on pensions in the price of leisure i = a, f,d
ds subjective discount factor
105ef labour efﬁciency index
EV equivalent variation
ex net exports
fp franchise for pension premium payments
g growth rate of GDP
gas public revenues from natural gas
gcb income of the Central Bank
gnt payments of ﬁrms to the government other than taxes and dividends
gpg government income from the lease of public grounds
hp premium base for private pension premiums
hs
p the discounted value of the premium base - DC system
ht tax base
i total gross domestic investments, exclusive clearing of land for building
ie gross investments of the private sector
ig gross public investments
k total domestic capital stock
ks
e capital stock of enterprises
ks
g aggregate public capital stock
ld labour demand enterprises
le employment in efﬁciency units enterprises
lh labour history (passed working years)
md
p weighted number of pensionable years
ns
g cohort population size g= f (females),m (males),h (females and males)
ni immigrants
p composite good price
pc goods consumption price
per early retirement premiums
pk user cost of capital
pl wage rate per worker of a certain age
106ple macro wage per worker in efﬁciency units
plg gross wage of households
pi
p pension premiums, i = a, f,d
prt pension rights target deﬁned contribution scheme
e pv unrestricted price of leisure
pv price of leisure
pv1 price of leisure attributable to net wages
pv2 price of leisure attributable to future pension rights
pW price of wealth




dg debt to gdp ratio
qdg primary deﬁcit ratio
qe emigration rate
qf funding ratio of the pension fund
qi immigration rate
qs sustainability gap
rb rate of return on bonds
rep equity premium
rg interest rate on government debt
rh interest rate on household wealth
rp rate of return pension funds
rs rate of return on shares
svf foreign sector savings
svg government savings
svh household’s savings
svp private pension fund savings
ter taxes paid on early retirement beneﬁts
tin indirect taxes minus subsidies
tk capital income tax
tl labour income tax
tp proﬁt tax
tpi tax on private pension beneﬁts
107tr pension income tax (private plus public)
ts seigniorage
tsb taxes on social beneﬁts
ttb total burden from the government
ty direct income tax on households
u per-period direct utility
U expected lifetime utility
U0 lifetime household utility, transformed
v household leisure
e v unrestricted demand for leisure
Ws total lifetime wealth households
f Ws total lifetime wealth less the present value of future labour induced total consumption
wbe bonds issued by ﬁrms
wbf bonds owned by foreigners
wbg bonds issued by the government net of bonds owned by the government
wbh bonds owned by households
wbp bonds owned by pension funds
wcg claims of the government on ﬁrms
wef change in assets through emigration
weh change in household assets through emigration
wep change in pension sector’s assets through emigration
wfc total assets
wfe ﬁnancial wealth of ﬁrms
wff aggregate foreign asset holdings
wfg aggregate government asset holdings
wfh aggregate household asset holdings
wfp aggregate pension fund assets holdings
wfph household lifetime ﬁnancial wealth (including pension rights)
wif change in assets through immigration
wih change household assets through immigration
wip change in pension sector assets through immigration
wng net wealth of the government
wi
ph pension rights i = a, f,d
wre revaluation of assets owned by ﬁrms
wres ﬁrms’ reserves
108wrf revaluation of assets owned by foreigners
wrg revaluation of government assets
wrh revaluation of assets owned by households
wrp revaluation of assets owned by pension funds
wse total shares issued by domestic private ﬁrms
wsf shares owned by foreigners
wsg shares owned by the government
wsh shares owned by households
wsp shares owned by pension funds
xa public outlays on public administration
xd public outlays on defence
xf total consumption above labour induced total consumption
xfo public transfers to foreigners
xh total household consumption
xi non-age related beneﬁts from the government
xl labour induced total consumption
xr public interest payments
xsu government subsidies
y total after tax income households
yf full, after-tax non-capital income of households
yg gross domestic product in factor prices
yge gross domestic product of the private sector in factor prices
ygg gross domestic product of the government
ygo exogenous production of ﬁrms in the base year
yp after-tax pension income households
yp1 pension income linked to labour before current year
yp2 pension income linked to current and future labour
ytn after-tax transfer income
yt individual transfer income
ywe wage sum of enterprises
ywh gross wage income households
ywg wage sum of the government
ywn after-tax wage income households
yze dividend payments, debt interest payments, central bank proﬁts and land lease payments of
ﬁrms
yzf foreign capital income
109yzg government capital income
yzh household capital income
yzp pension fund capital income
zp nominal liabilities of the pension fund
Greek symbols :
αc taste shift parameter - goods consumption
αv taste shift parameter - leisure consumption
β inverse of the price elasticity of leisure demand
γ inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
δ pure rate of time preference
ε fraction of workers with supplementary pension arrangement
ζ survival probability
θ share of labour in production
κ share of capital in production
µ shadow price of leisure
ν ﬁscal depreciation rate of ﬁrms
ξ survival rates corrected for immigration and emigration
ρ0 fraction of ﬁrm debt repaid in each period
ρ1 fraction of new investment ﬁnanced with new debt
σ substitution elasticity between capital and labour
τ tax or premium rate
τ i
cu catching-up premium rate i = a, f
τer early retirement (VUT) premium rate
τgp public pension premium rate
τli tax rate on labour income
τp corporate tax rate
τ i
pp pension premium rate i = a, f,d
τr tax rate on public and private pension beneﬁts
τsb tax rate on social beneﬁts
τ i
uc uniform contribution rate i = a, f
τy average tax rate on total income
φ technical rate of capital deterioration
ψ indexation factor for DB pension rights
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